Reparations, Microfinance, and Gender: A Plan, with Strategies for Implementation by Bernstein, Anita & Siebel, Hans D.
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2011
Reparations, Microfinance, and Gender: A Plan,
with Strategies for Implementation
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Hans D. Siebel
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
44 Cornell Int'l L. J. 75 (2011)
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-1\CIN106.txt unknown Seq: 1 17-MAR-11 13:40
Reparations, Microfinance, and Gender:
A Plan, with Strategies
for Implementation
Anita Bernstein† & Hans Dieter Seibel††
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 R
I. The Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 R
A. Engaging Microfinance Institutions to Effect
Reparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 R
1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 R
2. The Plan in Brief: Transfer Payments to, and Shares
in, Microfinance Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 R
3. Upgrading and Linking to Larger Financial
Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 R
4. Options for the Reparations Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 R
B. Extending the Microfinance Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 R
1. The Uses of Microfinance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 R
2. Heeding the Lessons of Microcredit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 R
C. Safeguards Against Gender-Related Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 R
II. The Mandate of International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 R
A. Pecuniary Reparations as a Technology of International
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 R
1. The Pecuniary Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 R
2. Individual and Collective Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 R
B. Integrating Gender Justice into Reparative Schemes: The
Mandate, Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 R
III. Macroeconomic Gains in Post-Conflict Nation-Building . . . 102 R
A. National Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 R
1. Gendered Returns on Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 R
2. Returns from Microfinance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 R
B. External Donor-Investor Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 R
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 R
† Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to
Tyler Korff for research assistance and to Diane Fahey, Arthur Pinto, Emily Prifogle, and
Sital Kalantry for helpful comments.
†† Professor Emeritus of Sociology, University of Cologne, Germany; Senior Fellow,
Development Research Center (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany; former Rural
Finance Advisor, International Fund for Agricultural Development, United Nations.
Thanks to Pablo de Greiff for alerting me to the relevance of microfinance in reparations
schemes.
44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 75 (2011)
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-1\CIN106.txt unknown Seq: 2 17-MAR-11 13:40
76 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 44
Introduction
Governments that set out to provide their citizens with reparations for
human rights violations on a national scale express their understanding of
the seriousness of those violations1 and attempt to achieve not only moral
but also political and economic gains.2  Distributing reparations in pecuni-
ary rather than non-pecuniary form— the choice manifested in most of the
reparations programs commenced in recent decades3— is a challenge for
any nation emerging from a humanitarian crisis, not only because of the
inherent scarcity of money,4 but also because expenditures of any kind in a
budget, not just reparations, can pursue only limited goals.
Priorities about how much and where to spend money always face
competition within governments, and reparations plans are not exempted
from having to compete.  When considering whether to appropriate funds
for reparations, a planner would want, in principle, to enhance the well-
being of recipients in a lasting way, preferably building their capacity for
self-help,5 because reparations programs in post-conflict settings are part
of a larger effort to strengthen and rebuild.  Unrest and threats to public
order typically accompany any plan to distribute money for the benefit of
victims.  A reparations plan gains political support when it can join larger
plans to enhance the nation’s prosperity and stability.
In this Article, mindful of divergent goals and mandates in different
countries and of the finitude of any pecuniary path, we recommend
microfinance as a mode of delivery for reparations.  We have advocated for
this goal in separate writings.6  Here we combine our arguments and con-
1. See Pablo de Greiff, Introduction: Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of
Human Rights Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 1, 11 (Pablo de Greiff ed.,
2006).
2. See generally GREGORY I. MASSING, CIVICS IN PRACTICE: PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT
AND ECONOMICS 565 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining the pursuit of political and economic
improvement by governments).
3. De Greiff, supra note 1, at 11 (equating reparations with payments).  In speaking R
of reparations as “pecuniary,” we refer to transfer payments that governments make to
individuals.  We intend to exclude investments in infrastructure, such as expanded
schools or health clinics, even if governments choose to describe these expenditures as
reparations.
4. Scarcity is not the only difficulty that pecuniary reparations face.  For an over-
view of issues that extend past the scope of this article, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Repara-
tions Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157 (2004).
5. On enhancing self-help of disadvantaged persons through government welfare
spending, see ISSUES FOR DEBATE IN SOCIAL POLICY: SELECTIONS FROM CQ, at 162– 63
(2010) (claiming that the War on Poverty failed in this goal for the American poor); SELF
HELP IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE: ENGLAND AND WEST GERMANY (Stephen Humble &
Judith Unell eds., 1989).  Here it may be necessary to say that we assume a degree of
sincerity or good faith, rather than pure rent-seeking, on the part of officials. See gener-
ally Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 203, 217 (2000) (concluding that the large literature on public choice notwith-
standing, “governmental action continues to be justified with reference to the public
good rather than the mechanical summing of individual preference.”).
6. See Anita Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations Following National Crisis:  A Conver-
gence of Tort Theory, Microfinance, and Gender Equality, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations]; Hans Dieter Seibel with Andrea Arm-
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cerns in a strategic perspective.
“Microfinance,” the term one of us coined in 1990,7 resembles the
more frequently used  “microcredit,”8 which itself gained fame in 2006
when the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded its annual Peace Prize to
the Grameen Bank and its founder, the economist Muhammad Yunus.9
Both terms refer to the extension of financial services in small amounts to
a low-income clientele, often as part of a deliberate strategy to enhance
their economic well-being, contribute to microenterprise development, and
alleviate poverty.  Microfinance is the wider of the two concepts.  Whereas
“microcredit” refers to small loans extended to borrowers who in the past
had been rejected as unbankable— that is, unworthy of credit and other
services— “microfinance” consists of all financial services that reach this
once-marginalized group, “includ[ing] savings, insurance, and money
transfers.”10
All microcredit is microfinance, in other words, but not all
microfinance is microcredit.  Because a pecuniary reparations scheme pre-
sumably seeks to create redress for injury rather than to impose a new
burden on victims, a reparations payment made in the form of
microfinance follows the logic of redress in eschewing the imposition of
debt and preferring an outright pecuniary transfer instead.  Pressing
microcredit on recipients and using this debt to generate income for those
who furnish capital does not give— or at least does not emphasize— com-
pensation or restitution, two central constituents of pecuniary reparations.
The other pecuniary alternative that we reject here is the one-off cash pay-
ment, a prevalent mode of distribution in reparations schemes of the last
two decades.11
strong, Reparations and Microfinance Schemes, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 677
(Pablo de Greiff ed. 2006); Hans Dieter Seibel, From Recipients of Reparation Payments to
Shareholders of Microfinance Institutions: A Study of the Possible Relations Between Repara-
tions for Victims of Human Rights Abuses and Microfinance 2 (Univ. of Cologne Dev.
Research Ctr.,2003) [hereinafter Seibel, Reparations Shareholders], available at http://
www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/08-2005/2003-6 ICTJ Microfinance.pdf.
7. See Hans Dieter Seibel, Does History Matter? The Old and New World of
Microfinance in Europe and Asia 1 at n.1 (Univ. of Cologne Dev. Research Ctr., 2003),
available at http://www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/10-2005/2005-10 The Old and the
New World in Europe and Asia.pdf.
8. “Microfinance” is gaining ground, however.  For example, in 2007 Forbes maga-
zine undertook for the first time to rank the world’s top microfinance institutions.  Mat-
thew Swibel, The 50 Top Microfinance Institutions, FORBES, (Dec. 20, 2007), http://
www.forbes.com/2007/12/20/microfinance-philanthropy-credit-biz-
cz_ms_1220microfinance_table.html.  On the discursive rivalry between these two
words, see Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 21. R
9. See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006
(Oct. 13, 2006), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ (claiming
that any effort to alleviate poverty would have to include microcredit).
10. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Microfinance Gateway, http://
www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.12263/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2010).
11. De Greiff, supra note 1, at 12– 13 (describing the prevalence of one-off pecuniary R
schemes).
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Building on earlier work,12 we argue that governments seeking to dis-
tribute pecuniary reparations in recognition of serious harms resulting
from human rights violations during national conflict should choose to
transfer shares and deposits in microfinance institutions.  Part I introduces
the proposal.  We claim that of all the ways to design a reparations scheme,
only a plan like this one— combining transfer payments to individuals with
the development of sustainable financial institutions— preserves the virtues
of pecuniary reparations while also fulfilling the political and
macroeconomic needs that often accompany a national crisis.13
Hewing to the Symposium theme of gender-based justice and vio-
lence,14 we place female participants in reparations programs at the center
of this Article.  When we speak about a recipient of pecuniary reparations
we have a woman in mind.  Misconceptions about male soldiers who suffer
and die to protect women-and-children civilians notwithstanding, national
conflict frequently imposes an extra measure of suffering on women.  Even
those women who are spared gender-based violence (such as rape and sex-
ual slavery) often experience more severe iterations of the harms that affect
the whole population.15  Our enthusiasm for shares in microfinance insti-
tutions rests in part on the dangers that alternative modes of pecuniary
reparation pose for the women who receive them.  Accordingly, women are
present as stakeholders and decision-makers throughout the Article.
In Part II, we survey the requirements of international law that impose
on nation-states an obligation to redress certain human rights violations.
Such redress, in our view, must take material and tangible forms.16
Because modern international law explicitly equates women’s rights with
human rights,17 our emphasis on women also comports with the human
rights mandates of international law, and we integrate female recipients
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
13. At the outset we acknowledge that our strategy faces perils.  Foremost, the
approach is untested: to date “[t]here is some experience with microfinance in postcon-
flict situations, but none with the use of reparations in building [microfinance institu-
tions] as instruments in a political or economic transition.”  Seibel with Armstrong,
supra note 6, at 679.  For planners willing to forge a new path, choosing the right level of R
legal controls for the microfinance institutions we would enlist is a fundamental chal-
lenge.  Like bank and corporation regulation generally, regulation of reparations-funded
microfinance institutions can flounder on the shoals of both too much shareholder
safety (which reduces profit) and too much managerial prerogative (which leads to not
enough safety for shareholders). Cf. Anita Bernstein, The 2x2 Matrix of Tort Reform’s
Distributions, 60 DE PAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author)
(juxtaposing security against freedom in the context of reforming tort law).  Literatures
critical of microcredit raise additional concerns. See infra notes 83– 89 and accompany- R
ing text.  In response, we make preliminary recommendations about safeguards that gov-
ernment planners might consider.
14. Sara Lulo, 2010 Symposium Issue Introduction, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2011).
15. Ruth Rubio-Mar´ın, The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies, in THE
GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 63, 63 (Ruth Rubio-Mar´ın ed., 2009) [hereinafter Rubio-Mar´ın, Tran-
sitional Societies].
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  For a thoughtful disagreement with our R
stance, see generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 4. R
17. See infra Part II.B.
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into a larger scheme.  Building on an argument by Lisa Magarrell,18 we
contend that although it is impossible for any reparations plan to achieve
restitutio ad integrum— a return to the past, the unscarred day before each
victim suffered a serious violation of her human rights— the microfinance
scheme proposed here would go further than any feasible alternative
toward the reparation that international law demands, because it reaches
the most effective balance between competing poles.
Because investment in microfinance moves national economic devel-
opment forward in several ways, a gender-aware reparations scheme mak-
ing use of microfinance would offer macroeconomic benefits to a nation
that extend beyond the gains to individuals and to gender justice that the
scheme might achieve.  We discuss two such benefits in Part III below.  We
focus on what a government already committed to reparations, but uncer-
tain of which program design to choose, would want to know.
I. The Strategy
If, as Flaubert was reputed to have written, le bon Dieu est dans le
detail,19 then microfinance-based reparations schemes will succeed or fail
based on their particulars.  Decision-makers choosing among alternative
modes of reparations would want to know the structure of a microfinance-
based plan, as well as how a base in gender justice and international law
can inform rebuilding after a national crisis.  Although sociocultural varia-
tion makes it impossible for us to state a set of optimal practices that would
pertain to every national setting,20 this Part offers guidance to planners
about the microfinance institutions in which distributees of reparations
would receive shares.
A. Engaging Microfinance Institutions to Effect Reparations
1. Terminology
As noted in the Introduction, we use microfinance to describe financial
services designed to meet the needs and circumstances of low-income cli-
ents.  The word includes savings, insurance, and money transfers.21  As for
microfinance institutions, these entities vary.  What we have in mind resem-
bles the communal and member-owned local financial entities that already
18. See Lisa Magarrell, Reparations for Massive or Widespread Human Rights Viola-
tions:  Sorting Out Claims for Reparations and the Struggle for Social Justice, 22 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 85 (2003) (making reference to reparations in Peru).  We also build on
Bernstein’s work. See Anita Bernstein, Tort Theory, Microfinance, and Gender Equality
Convergent in Pecuniary Reparations, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL
HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 291, 294– 95 (Ruth Rubio-
Mar´ın ed., 2009) [hereinafter Bernstein, Tort Theory].
19. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 275 (Fred R. Shapiro, ed., 2006).
20. Some of the breadth of what we are discussing can be conveyed at the Repara-
tions page of the International Center for Transitional Justice website.  Its variety
emerges in books of country-studies, reports, fact sheets, international conferences, and
aid by the Center to numerous countries. See Reparations –  International Center for
Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/782.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. R
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exist.  Governments would enlist these geographically scattered institu-
tions into the process of distributing reparations to individuals.
We classify microfinance institutions hierarchically as formal, semifor-
mal, or informal, depending on how closely national banking and corpo-
rate laws govern and supervise the institution in question.22  Entities in
which recipients can hold their reparations that governments pay might
fall into any of these three tiers.  The semiformal category, where govern-
ments recognize the entity but do not supervise its activities, probably
offers the most opportunity and flexibility for a reparations program,
except in countries with effective microfinance and microbanking laws and
networks of well-functioning institutions that have experience complying
with this legal regime.
2. The Plan in Brief: Transfer Payments to, and Shares in, Microfinance
Institutions
Governments that implement the reparations proposal described in
this Article would enlist microfinance institutions to provide for share-
holder ownership and distribute reparations payments to individuals in
the form of both monetary transfers and shares in these microfinance insti-
tutions.  Although national governments might find it necessary or politi-
cally desirable to create new institutions to carry out a reparations plan,
they would gain benefits from working with entities already functioning on
the ground, including credit NGOs or stable local microfinance institu-
tions.  Partnering with these existing institutions would bring to the plan
experience with savings and loans, credibility inside the targeted commu-
nities, and connections to a wider network of funds.
A central feature of the microfinance institution that we envision as a
participant in a reparations plan is that its holdings would go beyond the
deposits and shares that governments pay out.  Instead, capital paid by the
national government as reparations would join returns earned from
microfinance services that the institution would provide in the targeted
community at large.  We make this recommendation with the historical
record of indigenous self-help groups and savings-and-credit associations
in mind.  Such institutions often flourish, and at least do business, almost
everywhere in the world.23  Entities like these— which in this Article we
regard as instruments, rather than romantic saviors of the poor— dominate
the economies in which millions of people now make their living.
Microfinance institutions would integrate reparations transfer payments
into the network of savings and credit that sustains a nation in transition.
When making reparations payments, a national government would
use two modes of distribution.  First, it would give out shares that allot
22. The taxonomy is Seibel’s. See Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at R
22– 23.  We discuss the tiers in more detail below, when describing how microfinance
institutions grow to reach new sources of capital. See infra Part I.A.3.
23. See generally FINANCIAL PROMISE FOR THE POOR:  HOW GROUPS BUILD MICROSAVINGS
(Kim Wilson et al. eds., 2010) (providing examples of indigenous self-help groups from
around the world).
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each recipient an equity stake in the microfinance institution that would
include a say in management, likely in the form of voting rights.24  Second,
the government would deposit cash payments directly into accounts at that
institution in the name of each recipient shareholder.
The prescriptive delineation of our plan stops here.  In particular, we
refrain deliberately from trying to state rules or “best practices” about how
a reparations-transfer might be withdrawn from the microfinance institu-
tion by its recipient or used as collateral for a loan.  We leave that question
to individual recipients, local and national regulators, and the institution
itself.
We predict enhancements to the post-crisis economy that would
become measureable relatively quickly after the creation of transfers and
ownership.  Funded by government-provided shares as well as nongovern-
mental capital,25 each microfinance institution can make loans designed to
enhance local economic development.  Recipients of reparations transfers
who seek access to larger amounts of capital could apply for a loan at the
institution in which they hold shares.  Other individuals would also bor-
row and repay money in pursuit of entrepreneurial projects.  Any loan can
fail, of course; we make no predictions about rates of return.  Satisfactory
performance of the institution, however, would attract more capital, and
this growth would in turn generate a larger volume of funds for recipient-
owners to spend on their income-generating activities.
Although the success or failure of any reparations program will always
be both debatable and debated, governments that pursue microfinance-
based reparations have a useful quantitative measuring device at hand:
they can monitor the performance of each microfinance institution by not-
ing standard financial performance indicators before and after the transfer
of their payments.  Stagnation or dissipation of capital would indicate fail-
ure.  Increases in the total capital held by the institution, the number of
transactions, the size of loans that borrowers take and repay, and the rates
of participation not tied to government-paid transfers are among the mea-
surements that will support a judgment of success.26  These increases
would show that what originated as redress, compensation, rehabilitation,
and reintegration went on to become a source of development for the
national economy as well.
3. Upgrading and Linking to Larger Financial Institutions
Crises that cause institutions of a nation to collapse usually leave
standing indigenous entities that can form a base for both economic devel-
24. We have in mind one share per recipient, but circumstances may call for other
arrangements.
25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B. R
26. Microfinance-based reparations could succeed at the fiscal level and fail by other
criteria. See infra notes 88– 89 and accompanying text (noting findings of adverse effects R
on women attributed to Grameen microcredit).  Standard financial performance metrics,
however, have at least the virtue of clarity to commend them.
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opment and reparations.27  Planners can work with these institutions.
Because economic development fosters socially progressive development as
well,28 strengthening these smaller and less formal business affiliations
would comport with the overall reparative project.
We have spoken of microfinance institutions as occupying three tiers.
Formal institutions are (or closely resemble) the banks, insurance compa-
nies, and other financial services providers familiar to the affluent West.
These entities register as corporations and financial institutions under the
law and are regulated and supervised by a central bank or bank superin-
tendency.  Informal institutions, at the other end of the spectrum, operate
away from regulation and state scrutiny.29  Officially unknown to the gov-
ernment, they respond to demand from poor people and provide a variety
of services, their main products being the gathering of small deposits and
the making of small loans.30  Prominent among informal institutions are
rotating and non-rotating savings and credit groups or associations, which
are usually governed by traditional law.31  In the middle is the semiformal
tier.  Semiformal microfinance institutions are usually registered with some
government agency but not subject to financial regulation and supervision.
Nongovernmental credit organizations, also known as “credit NGOs,” dom-
inate the semiformal category.32
In the developing world, informal institutions have grown alongside
the formal and semiformal sectors, both of which are often of limited
reach, and diversified to provide financial services to a varied clientele.33
The development literature has long extolled this informal tier for its flexi-
bility, responsiveness, low transaction costs, inclusiveness of women, and
ability to build collateral from nontraditional sources like community par-
ticipation.34  Although we share in this appreciation, we nevertheless rec-
ommend the upgrading of informal institutions to semiformal or formal
levels as an aim for microfinance-based reparations.35  Regulation and
27. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 692. R
28. See ALLIANCE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, POLICY NOTE: FORMALIZING MICROSAVINGS:
A TIERED APPROACH TO REGULATING INTERMEDIATION 2 (2010), available at http://
www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.43671/Formaliz-
ing%20microsavings.pdf [hereinafter Formalizing Microsavings].
29. For an alternative approach to classification, see Mark Schreiner, Informal
Finance and the Design of Microfinance, 11 DEV. IN PRAC. 637 (2000) (using “micro-
finance” to refer to what we call the “formal” level, and “informal finance” for what we
call the informal tier of microfinance).
30. BRIGIT HELMS, ACCESS FOR ALL: BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 35– 38
(2006).  To a lesser extent, these services include emergency and funeral assistance.
31. Private moneylenders also fall in the informal tier.  Because in this Article we
focus on self-help, however, we exclude them from our version of the category.
32. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 689– 90. R
33. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. MARX, GEWOHNHEITSRECHT ALS ENTWICKLUNGSPOTENTIAL:
SELBSTHILFEORGANISATIONEN IN NIGERIA (1990) [Customary Law as Development Poten-
tial: Self-Help Organizations in Nigeria] (explaining the history and development of sev-
eral types of informal indigenous savings and credit institutions in Nigeria).
34. See Schreiner, supra note 29, at 638 (reviewing the literature).
35. Elsewhere Seibel describes in greater detail the ways in which informal financial
institutions grow into more formal regulation.  See HANS DIETER SEIBEL & MICHAEL T.
MARX, DUAL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AFRICA: CASE STUDIES OF LINKAGES BETWEEN INFORMAL
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supervision, though initially costly to the informal entity, enhance pros-
pects for sustainability and growth.36  Increased formality alleviates the
categorical detriments of informal microfinance institutions, which include
constraints on loan amounts (because debts must be small and short-
term), an absence of deposit insurance, and, for borrowers and depositors,
limited recourse to legal systems to enforce contracts.37
A “policy note” published by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion in
2010 pays similar attention to institutional tiers that we note in this Arti-
cle.38  This document, entitled Formalizing Microsavings, urges national
governments to create a special license to cover microfinance institutions
that offer savings accounts, separate from the one that commercial banks
currently use.39  The new license so proposed would provide shareholder-
depositors with more security than they now receive.  As a further recom-
mendation, Formalizing Microsavings encourages greater stringency for the
special license with respect to some activities and risks, and greater leni-
ency with respect to others.40
Without commenting on the particulars of what Formalizing Microsav-
ings recommends, some of which contain more detail than we are prepared
to defend, we note that its proposed special license offers an instrument of
upgrading. Informal microfinance institutions have many virtues but have
won acclaim much more for debt than savings, and safe savings is the most
important priority for pecuniary reparations.  With an eye toward more
security for shareholder-recipients, governments should subject informal
microfinance institutions to at least some of the regulatory demands of
higher tiers.
Upgrading allows microfinance institutions to grow; however, without
connections to larger sources of capital, this growth has a natural limit.
One way to overcome that limit is demonstrated by India’s successes in
linkage banking.41  This practice, based on pilot experience in Indonesia,
connects informal rural institutions with the formal banking sector.42
AND FORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1987); Hans Dieter Seibel, Upgrading, Downgrad-
ing, Linking, Innovating: Microfinance Development Strategies— A Systems Perspective
(Univ. of Cologne Working Paper No. 1997-6, 1997), available at http://www.uni-
koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/PDFold%28revised%29/1997_6.pdf; Hans Dieter Seibel, Saving for
Development: A Linkage Model for Informal and Formal Financial Markets, 4 Q.J. INT’L
AGRIC. 390 (1985).
36. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 693. See generally HANS DIETER SEIBEL, R
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND MICROFINANCE: VIABLE INSTITUTIONS, APPROPRIATE
STRATEGIES AND SUSTAINABLE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE MICROECONOMY (1996).
37. Schreiner, supra note 29, at 638– 39.
38. Formalizing Microsavings, supra note 28.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Compare id. at 7 (noting lower capital requirements for specialized institutions)
with id. at 8 (noting limits on risk exposure and prohibitions on certain high risk
activities).
41. Seibel, Reparations Shareholders, supra note 6, at 20. See also Stefan Karduck & R
Hans Dieter Seibel, Transaction Costs of Self-Help Groups: A Study of NABARD’s SHG
Banking Programme in India, in FINANCIAL GROWTH IN INDIA AND CHINA 196 (Dhandapani
Alagiri ed., 2006) (analyzing linkage banking data from India).
42. Seibel, Reparations Shareholders, supra note 6, at 19. R
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Coordinated by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(NABARD) and backed by the central bank, Self-Help Promoting Institu-
tions, which include NGOs, government agencies, and banks in India pro-
mote and assist informal “self-help groups” of up to twenty members, with
groups beyond that size required to register under Indian association
law.43
As of March 2009, linkage banking, the predominant mode of
microfinance in India, encompassed 6.12 million self-help groups holding
bank deposits and 4.22 million self-help groups with bank loans outstand-
ing.  The non-performance ratio for loans from banks to self-help groups
was 2.9%, and 80% of the self-help groups were comprised entirely of
women, leading to an overall female membership of approximately 90%.
These self-help groups covered over 86 million poor households.44
Linkage banking has delivered credit to the rural poor in India, inte-
grated self-help groups into national financial markets, and enabled com-
mercial banks to reach out beneficially to microentrepreneurs.45  A 2009
study of NABARD operations published by the Reserve Bank of India, the
central bank, reported positive results notwithstanding the word “critique”
in its title.46  Flaws (including significant regional disparities) persist, but
Reserve Bank researchers ascribed disappointments of linkage banking to
insufficient investment rather than any deficiency in linkage banking as
such.47  Furthermore, an increasing number of self-help groups have
organized in federations at the village, district, and higher levels.48  Federa-
tions help them leverage their strength.49
The Indian version of linkage banking balances savings and credit,
and suggests a blueprint for reparations programs that would emphasize
safe savings while also providing additional capital for new loans.  Govern-
ments choosing microfinance institutions to receive and hold reparations
transfer payments ought to borrow linkage practices— from India and else-
where— that are suited to the needs of geographically dispersed recipients:
“[w]ith some modifications, the [linkage banking] approach could also be
43. See generally National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD),
http://www.nabard.org/introduction.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
44. See NABARD, BASIC FIGURES ON SHG BANKING IN INDIA, 2008-09i– xvi (2008),
available at http://www.nabard.org/pdf/Status of Microfinance in India 2008 09_
131109.pdf.  For an external analysis of the NABARD linkage banking record, see
Karduck & Seibel, supra note 41. R
45. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 680, 693. R
46. Pankaj Kumar & Ramesh Golait, Bank Penetration and SHG-Bank Linkage Pro-
gram: A Critique, 29 RESERVE BANK OF INDIA OCCASIONAL PAPERS 119 (2009).
47. Id. at 136– 38.
48. See C.S. Reddy et al., SHG Federations in India 12– 17 (2007), available at http://
www.apmas.org/pdf/SHGfinalbook.pdf.
49. Pertinent to the gender thesis of this Article and this Symposium, one donor and
bank-funded study reported that when village women join self-help group “clusters and
federations, [they] can gain experience of relevant processes (regular meetings, taking
decisions, allocating money).  They also become more ‘visible’ in the village. . . .” EDA
RURAL SYSTEMS, SELF HELP GROUPS IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE LIGHTS AND SHADES 5 (2006),
available at http://www.edarural.com/documents/SHG-Study/Executive-Summary.pdf.
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jumpstarted by, or otherwise incorporate, reparations payments.”50
4. Options for the Reparations Plan
Our phrase “options for the reparations plan” expresses our intent to
withhold answers to certain recurring questions about how to set up a
microfinance-based reparations program.  Although we make specific rec-
ommendations when we can, working at a more general plane has its own
virtues.  By insisting that planners take local conditions into account, our
approach to reparations design ameliorates the perception of a top-down
external imposition.  Here we mention a few terms of microfinance-based
reparations that are, in our opinion, negotiable and flexible.
Foremost, the regulation of a microfinance institution that receives
and holds transfer payments need not be heavy.  Both “semiformal” institu-
tions— which are registered with national governments but not regulated as
banks or financial companies— and “informal” institutions could partici-
pate in programs that distribute reparations from national governments.
Semiformal institutions offer better oversight than informal ones and are in
that sense more suited to the task, but if only informal institutions are
available, governments should consider enlisting them and encourage the
formation of new links to the formal tier.  Nongovernmental organizations
can aid planners in identifying and scrutinizing local entities.
Governments ought to emphasize sustainability for institutions that
take part in the reparations scheme, even at the expense of other goals.  For
example, regardless of how formal the participating institution may be, one
level of regulation that should be omitted in a reparations distribution is
controls on interest rates for the loans the entity makes.  The literature on
microcredit supports this deregulatory inclination,51 and philanthropic
motives following national crisis should not impede this enhancement to
sustainable development.  For another example, concerns about gender
progress— which we have emphasized that we share— should accommodate
rather than try to supersede the gender-segregation within a given country
and culture.  We stress that it is only either integration or segregation, not
subordination, of women that planners ought to tolerate.  Although “sepa-
rate but equal” may be as challenging in the context of microfinance as it is
in United States race relations,52 we believe that as long as the women who
participate have some sphere of power in controlling money,53 planners
should not compel microfinance institutions to impose gender integration
50. Seibel, Reparations Shareholders, supra note 6, at 19. See also  Hans Dieter Seibel, R
Linking Informal and Formal Institutions in Africa and Asia, in MICROENTERPRISES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  97, 118 (Jacob Levitsky ed., 1989).
51. See, e.g., Bob Christen & Ignacio Mas, It’s Time to Address the Microsavings Chal-
lenge, Scalably, 20 ENTERPRISE DEV. & MICROFINANCE 274, 276 (2009) (noting with regret
that many national banking laws around the world cap interest rates); Schreiner, supra
note 29, at 638 (reporting this barrier to sustainable microfinance). R
52. See Martin L. Levy, “Separate But Equal is Inherently Unequal”, 28 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 121, 121 (2003).
53. Eleanor Roosevelt, writing in 1953 about the United Nations Draft Convention
on the Rights of Women, described the goal we have in mind:
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on the operations of the entity, but instead leave this decision to local
participants.54
In general, once the government writes or conveys basic rules to
enhance the safety of funds that shareholder-owners wish to keep undis-
turbed in a savings account, it ought to curb its impulse to regulate.  Plan-
ners will probably be tempted to attach conditions to the sum it deposits in
the name of each recipient— rules restricting hasty withdrawal and prevent-
ing deposit money from serving as collateral for a loan for the benefit of
someone other than the recipient shareholder are among the restrictions
that might arise— but controls on the use of reparations payments should
come from stakeholders and not from the national government that dis-
burses reparations.55  We recommend that controls emerge from multiple
sources: existing national laws regulating banks and other corporations,
the board and management of the institution, and shareholders themselves,
acting as owner-recipients of the reparations payments in question.
B. Extending the Microfinance Record
Having acknowledged that paying reparations through microfinance is
an untested idea,56 we endeavor to be cautious in this summary of how and
why a nation deciding among alternative reparations plans should choose
the path we recommend.  We base our endorsement of microfinance in
part on our own field research and in part in a review of the literature; we
seek the most conservative projection of benefits to the implementing
nation.  For this purpose we explore differences between microcredit-as-
debt on one hand and microfinance-as-outright-transfer on the other.
1. The Uses of Microfinance
When writing about microfinance, commentators often begin with the
truism that it is “no panacea,”57 and then proceed to divide into skeptical
Even in countries where for many years women have voted and been eligible for
public office, there are still too few women serving in positions of real leader-
ship. I am not talking now in terms of paper parliaments and honorary appoint-
ments. Neither am I talking about any such artificial balance as would be
implied in a 50-50, or a 40-60 division of public offices. What I am talking about
is whether women are sharing in the direction of the policy making in their
countries. . . .
Eleanor Roosevelt, U.N. Deliberations on Draft Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, 28 DEP’T ST. BULL. 29, 29 (1953).
54. For a detailed example of how gender segregation can coexist with gains in
wealth for women, see Hans Dieter Seibel, Village Banks in Vientiane Capital, LAO PDR:
Roadmap Scenarios for a Sustainable Future (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://mikro
finanzwiki.de/sites/default/files/Village_Banks_in_Vientiane_Capital_LAO_PDR.pdf
(describing microfinance in Laos).
55. Cf. Formalizing Microsavings, supra note 28, at 4 (observing that “innovation is
driven first by unregulated microcredit organizations.  Over time, these organizations
develop into a promising service sector. . . .”).
56. See supra note 13. R
57. Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 26 n.77 (citing writings that R
use this phrase).
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and enthusiastic camps.58  We put ourselves in the cautious wing of the
enthusiastic camp.  Postponing for now the macroeconomic question of
whether microfinance builds national wealth, which we will address
later,59 we note three improvements to individuals’ circumstances that
planners can reasonably expect to produce when they install a
microfinance-based reparations scheme.
First, the creation or strengthening of local financial institutions
would offer a secure place for victims of human rights violations to store
their reparations payments and would protect the savings that these pay-
ments can generate.60  The large majority of reparations recipients are poor
people, and at present many of the world’s poor lack access to such an
institution, even the humblest kind.61  Studies of the savings and other
financial practices of poor persons around the developing world report that
the poor want a safe place to keep their savings much more than they want
loans.62  Expanding this kind of outreach to people who are cut off from
bank accounts benefits not only the enterprise-minded, who are probably a
minority in every geographical region or set of reparations recipients, but
also ordinary people suffering from present insecurity on top of the serious
human rights violations in their recent past.63
Second, a strengthened or newly created financial institution makes
credit available to borrowers who may have been written off as unbank-
able.64  Despite publicity surrounding microfinance as a worldwide phe-
nomenon, researchers agree that large numbers of people remain out of its
reach.65  Microcredit experts have contended that the supply of money for
loans— comprised of savings and equity and including retained earnings,
58. For a summary of negative commentary on microcredit, see Mac Margolis, Lining
Up the Loan Angels, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 9, 2007), http://www.newsweek.com/2007/04/08/
lining-up-the-loan-angels.html. For a comprehensive critique, see generally MILFORD
BATEMAN, WHY DOESN’T MICROFINANCE WORK?  THE DESTRUCTIVE RISE OF LOCAL NEOLIBER-
ALISM (2010).
59. See infra Part III.A.2.
60. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 678. R
61. See Jennifer L. Schenker, Mobile Money for the Unbanked, INFORMILO (Dec. 7,
2009), http://www.informilo.com/20091207/mobile-money-unbanked-212 (noting that
an estimated 2.5 billion adults in the world lack access to banks).
62. See, e.g., STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY 1, 19– 20 (2d ed.
2009).  In response to this deficiency, Rutherford founded a micro-savings institution
called Safe Save.  Employees of Safe Save, all women, make daily visits to depositors,
collecting sums (as small as 1.5 cents a day) and recording these savings in hand-held
computers. See SAFESAVE, http://www.safesave.org/products.html. See also Formalizing
Microsavings, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that “[i]n virtually every country in the world,
the existing supply of savings services falls short of the demand from low income
populations.”).
63. See generally DARYL COLLINS ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR 3 (2009) (noting that
“poor households are frustrated by the poor quality— above all the low reliability— of the
instruments that they use to manage their meager incomes.”).
64. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 678.
65. See Formalizing Microsavings, supra note 28, at 1; M.G. Olujide, Assessment of
Micro-Credit Supply by Country Women Association of Nigeria (COWAN) to Rural Women
in Ondo State, Nigeria, 4 WORLD J. AGRIC. SCI. 79, 83 (2008) (making the same observa-
tion in a particular national context).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\44-1\CIN106.txt unknown Seq: 14 17-MAR-11 13:40
88 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 44
donor and investor funds, and domestic commercial bank credit accessible
to microfinance institutions, self-help groups, and individuals— is too low
and ought to be expanded.66  This claim about an inadequate supply indi-
cates a need for flexibility that can be at least partially filled by
microfinance institutions.  The microfinance-based mode of reparations
gathers financial resources together but does not command that it go to
loans; instead, it is flexible and responsive to demand on the ground.  Rep-
arations recipients act as both depositors and shareholders empowered to
disburse loan money to applicants.
Third, a plan that invites the recipients of reparations into the govern-
ance of a local financial institution mobilizes their capacity for self-help
and self-management, providing them with a material base of power on
which they can build.67  Again, recall the context of a ravaged nation.  Self-
help is the backbone of any wartime and postwar economy; recipients will
have been looking out for themselves when their payments arrive.
Microfinance-based reparations in this sense align with other stability-
enhancing measures considered and used by reparations planners, includ-
ing education and skills training.68  Autonomy and commercial participa-
tion become more available to recipients, starting when peers in the
community communicate about income-generating activities and other
coping strategies.
Measures that strengthen self-help extend beyond meeting the short-
term financial needs of recipients and their families.  Because the repara-
tions scheme shifts money from the central government toward diverse
66. See, e.g., Mark Hannam, Life, Liberty, and Access to Credit  (Jun. 25, 2010), http:/
/oecdinsights.org/2010/06/25/life-liberty-and-access-to-credit (arguing that access to
credit is a human right); Muhammad Yunus, How Donor Funds Could Better Reach and
Support Grassroots Microcredit Programs Working Towards the Microcredit Summit’s
Goal and Core Themes 6-8 (June 24– 26, 1999), http://www.microcreditsummit.org/
papers/donorpaper.pdf (identifying structural impediments to the delivery of loan capi-
tal to poor borrowers) [hereinafter Yunus, Donor Funds].
The problem runs deeper for women who want to borrow money:
Why it is difficult for women to borrow from banks?  Rural women in particular
find it difficult to borrow from banks because most do not have bank accounts,
they have no collateral to present to the bank, and many women do not know
the procedures for accessing bank loans.  As they explained, while men inherit
land and other property which they can use as collateral, women do not inherit
property.  They also said that women need their husband’s consent to borrow
money from the bank.
Christiana E.E. Okojie et al., Institutional Environment and Access to Microfinance by Self-
Employed Women in the Rural Areas of Edo State, Nigeria 6 (Int’l Food Pol. Res. Inst.,
Nigeria Strategy Support Program Background Paper No. NSSP 003, 2009) (emphasis in
original), available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/nsspbp03.
pdf. But see Thomas Dichter, A Second Look at Microfinance 5– 6 (Cato Inst. Center for
Global Liberty & Prosperity Dev. Pol’y Briefing Paper No. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.cato.org/pubs/dbp/dbp1.pdf (arguing that the poor use savings instead of loans to
start businesses, and that stable credit is a product of business growth, not a cause
thereof).
67. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 678; cf. Rubio-Mar´ın, Transitional Socie- R
ties, supra note 15, at 109– 10 (noting that because women often start out deprived, they R
prefer “reintegration and rehabilitation” over “restitution” within reparations schemes).
68. Rubio-Mar´ın, Transitional Societies, supra note 15, at 113. R
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microfinance institutions that may have ties to larger entities, it links recip-
ients to local centers of power.  These new networks can provide a counter-
weight to a national government that has been at best weak or ineffective in
the recent past.69  Self-help in this sense reaches to the future, offering to
recipients a brighter prognosis for the economic investments they may
choose to make.
Our roster of expected benefits based on past experiences with
microcredit is conservative, as befits a proposal that contains risk.  It does
not indulge in the wishful thinking that implementing a microfinance-
based reparations plan will create national wealth on a substantial scale.
We do believe that making reparations through microfinance generates
wealth, stability, and sustainability at a local level,70 but we disregard these
hypothetical gains for present purposes.  If the plan is implemented cor-
rectly, it would expand access to savings accounts, increase the supply of
credit, and provide an opportunity for vulnerable people to gain some
power.
2. Heeding the Lessons of Microcredit
Having outlined the upside of our proposal in conservative terms, we
turn now to its possible downsides.  The version of microfinance that we
advocate in this Article— outright transfers rather than loans— eliminates
many but not all of the detriments and burdens that microcredit can gener-
ate.71  Our proposal can be viewed as only one step away from microcredit,
because the microfinance institutions that we wish to see launched or
expanded as part of a reparations program operate first by absorbing share
capital and accepting deposits, but then subsequently lending money.  To
the extent that debt harms the poor (or at least some of them, the impru-
dent or unfortunate), we are advocating more harm.  Several distinctions
separate our proposal from microcredit as currently practiced, however,
and extend its record in a constructive new direction.
69. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 678– 79; Bernstein, Tort Theory, supra R
note 18, at 309– 10. R
70. See infra Part III.A.
71. One such downside is the burdensome nature of debt. See Margolis, supra note
58 (quoting Judge Richard Posner: “The idea of borrowing one’s way out of poverty is
passing strange.”).  Even if individuals can indeed borrow their way out of poverty, loans
generate pressures on these individuals to repay debt that add their own dangers. See
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has Misperceived the
Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 253– 64 (2005) (describ-
ing aggressive tactics to compel repayment to the Grameen Bank, as imposed by both
bank employees and members of the borrowing “solidarity circle” that has responsibility
to repay the loan).  Microcredit programs that target female borrowers created gender-
based detriments in Bangladesh. See id. at 264 (reporting an increase of verbal aggres-
sion and domestic violence  by male relatives in connection with their coercion of
women to take out microcredit loans, for the repayment of which the women, as nominal
borrowers, remain solely liable). See also Bernstein, Tort Theory, supra note 18, at 321 R
(speculating that a woman struggling to repay a microloan “might feel compelled to
draft her children into her struggling business; under this pressure, a daughter would
probably look more valuable to her mother as a housekeeper and child-minder than a
student continuing her education.”).
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First, the transfer we describe honors a claim for repair of a human
rights violation.  Because governments disburse payments to classes of
individuals based on criteria related to the harms they have suffered, the
problem of pressure by relatives to make an application lessens; receiving
such payments as a government-sponsored transfer requires little or no
entrepreneurial application.  Second, prerogatives for individuals-cum-
shareholders of microfinance institutions reduce the documented draw-
backs of microcredit.  Whereas taking out a loan obliges a borrower to pay
back the principal along with interest— and, in the context of at least one
famed microbank, comes with non-pecuniary tasks and pressures72— our
proposal imposes no new obligations on a recipient.  As a shareholder and
depositor, the reparations recipient need not borrow money nor involve
herself in any loan decisions.
Moreover, because it expands its base to include shareholder-recipi-
ents who, unlike the plucky borrowers of microcredit lore, have not mani-
fested any entrepreneurial inclination before they participate, the
reparations plan we advocate adds a stabilizing constituency to the
microfinance institution.  New shareholders are likely to favor safety over
higher-yielding risk.  These new owners will enlarge the demand for— and
from there, the supply of— sober financial services, such as life and funeral
insurance.
C. Safeguards Against Gender-Related Abuses
Microfinance has long enjoyed a reputation for elevating the position
of women.73  In our prior work we have, to a degree, shared this enthusi-
asm.74  Focused here on strategies for implementation, we urge govern-
ments to heed concerns related to gender equality that will arise as part of
any microfinance-based reparations scheme.  Awareness is the most funda-
mental prescription we can make, but we also have a few specifics about
how to assuage foreseeable detriments to women.
A report issued by the Swiss Agency for Development and Coopera-
tion identifies four classes of constraints that operate to cut women off
from the gains of economic development and thus may harm the prospects
of a microfinance-based reparations plan.75  First, legal barriers, such as
laws requiring the consent of a male relative to engage in a business trans-
72. See Methodology, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=169 (last visited Sept. 17, 2010)
(describing the Sixteen Decisions that Grameen Bank members must pledge when
accepting loans).
73. See Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 4– 5, 31; see also sources R
cited infra note 81 and accompanying text. R
74. Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 37– 43 (concluding that the R
record of microfinance, despite several disappointments, suggests that microfinance
enhances the status of women); Seibel, Reparations Shareholders, supra note 6, at 18 R
(reporting gains experienced by women from microfinance in Syria).
75. SWISS AGENCY FOR DEV. & COOPERATION, THE GENDER APPROACH IN SMALL ENTER-
PRISE DEVELOPMENT 3 (1999), available at http://www.intercooperation.ch/sed/down
load/issuepapers/issue1-eng.pdf [hereinafter Gender Approach].
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action, impede women in several countries.  Second, sociocultural condi-
tions present in some countries restrict women to the household or
otherwise discourage their participation in business.  The third and related
category of women-specific constraints, family obligations, typically
increases domestic workloads for women and thereby limits their mobility.
Finally, women suffer from inferior access to institutional supports, includ-
ing job training and occupational or professional networks to expand their
economic opportunities.
Our premise that a microfinance-based reparations plan would serve
the goal of gender equality is mindful of the gap between transferring
money to individual women and enhancing the status of women in society
at large.  Making reference to fieldwork she did in South Asia, Linda
Mayoux brings pertinent issues to the fore.  Women may be participating
in microenterprise out of a “desperate” need for income, Mayoux writes,
rather than making a free, “conscious choice” to do so.76  Contrary to eco-
nomic theory, women also do not always benefit when their income rises.
Their male relatives are likely to cooperate with their entrepreneurial activi-
ties only when those efforts bring money under male control and where
the activity does not “require any change in women’s unpaid domestic or
productive work.”77  Gains from the activity thus “may merely substitute
for male expenditure on family needs, freeing more male income for their
own personal luxury expenditure.”78  Moreover, because of gender segrega-
tion in labor markets, female entrepreneurs typically compete with other
women; and although they have a better record than their male counter-
parts on sexual harassment and sexual exploitation, female entrepreneurs
“are as likely as men to manipulate gender inequalities and gender
stereotypes.”79
Commentary by the founder of the Grameen Bank informs this analy-
sis.  Muhammad Yunis won fame for his choice to lend money to women
rather than men.80  Rhetoric of female empowerment continues to accom-
pany discussions of microfinance policy.81  As one observer has argued,82
76. LINDA MAYOUX, U.N. RES. INST. FOR SOC. DEV., FROM VICIOUS TO VIRTUOUS CIR-
CLES?  GENDER AND MICRO-ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 26 (1995), available at http://www.
unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/d2a23ad2d50cb2a280256eb300385855/590
1781754e7c91580256b67005b6af7/$FILE/opb3.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 27.
79. Id.
80. Dyal-Chand, supra note 71, at 220.
81. See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE
AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 71 (1999) (remarking that Grameen was intentionally “gender-
biased” towards women due to the existence of a banking system that was “created for
men.”). See also Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179,
243 n.325 (1995) (contending that Grameen advanced “the emancipation, status, and
economic independence of women.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 345, 398 (2003) (claiming that the experience of Grameen borrowing “has created
the cohesion necessary” to resist gender-based injustice); Charlotte E. Lott, Why Women
Matter: The Story of Microcredit, 27 J.L. & COM. 219, 230 (2009) (stating that
“[m]icrocredit with women as the principal borrowers is a powerful tool in the reduction
of poverty and the transformation of society.”); Katherine Spengler, Note, Expansion of
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however, the Grameen model rests on a perception of women as instru-
ments.83 Lending to women-as-instruments originates in a belief that
women direct their borrowed money to good ends.  From here, it becomes
easy for microlenders to regard power for women as irrelevant or even
counterproductive, rather than a desirable goal in itself.
One detailed review undertaken by Aminur Rahman in the 1990s
attributed the Grameen Bank’s high repayment rate in significant part to
domineering behavior by male employees over female borrowers.84
Rahman interviewed several bank workers who described these women as
“shy,” “submissive,” and “immobile,” whereas male borrowers, to these
informants, were “arrogant” and belligerent when faced with collection or
monitoring efforts from the bank.85  Because women remain geographi-
cally “immobile” compared to men in Bangladesh, they are less able to
move away after defaulting on a loan, and also carry the extra burden of
maintaining family honor.  They know that a default would bring disgrace
to their relatives to a degree that male defaulting would not.86
Another concern about gender in microcredit is “fronting,” a practice
whereby men pressure women to take out female-only loans subject to the
men’s use and control.  Researchers confirm that worries about male rela-
tives’ appropriating monies set aside for women have a foundation in real
experience.87  One much-cited study of Grameen found that 63% of the
borrowers— all women— had no direct control over what to do with the loan
proceeds which, of course, these women were personally obliged to
repay.88  Scholars of microfinance find the “fronting” problem especially
acute when loan sizes are relatively large or available to support industries
where men participate as entrepreneurs.89
Third World Women’s Empowerment: The Emergence of Sustainable Development and the
Evolution of International Economic Strategy, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL L. & POL’Y 303,
334– 39 (2001) (arguing that making microcredit more available to women may help
increase sustainable agricultural practices).
82. Dyal-Chand, supra note 71, at 262.
83. See, e.g., YUNUS, supra note 81, at 72 (noting that “money entering a household
through a woman brings more benefits to the family as a whole.”).
84. AMINUR RAHMAN, WOMEN AND MICROCREDIT IN RURAL BANGLADESH 73– 74 (1999).
85. Id.; see also STUART RUTHERFORD, THE PLEDGE: ASA, PEASANT POLITICS, AND
MICROFINANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLANDESH 135 (2009) (reporting the use of
shaming tactics in repayment collection by the Association for Social Advancement, a
large Bangladeshi organization similar to Grameen).
86. Dyal-Chand, supra note 71, at 263.
87. HELEN TODD, WOMEN AT THE CENTER: GRAMEEN BANK BORROWERS AFTER ONE DEC-
ADE 81– 83 (1996) (concluding that about a quarter of Grameen borrowers have became
disempowered rather than empowered by microloans because men gained control over
the money); RAHMAN, supra note 84, at 109– 15 (concluding that many women have been R
made worse off by access to Grameen loans because Grameen regards only the female
borrowers as responsible for repayment, a condition that increases male pressure on
female relatives to take out these loans for male use).
88. Anne Marie Goetz & Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit?  Gender, Power, and
Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEV. 45, 49
(1996).
89. Mayoux, supra note 76, at 38.
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These findings contain some nuance, however.  For example, men who
control a loan nominally assigned to women often contribute to repaying
it.90  Aminur Rahman, the anthropologist critical of Grameen, found posi-
tive welfare effects for women holding Grameen loans that they did not
control once he compared them to wives of men who had borrowed money
from other lenders.91  In other words, comparing two couples that both live
with a loan that the man controls indicates that the wife is better off in the
couple that has a Grameen loan in the name of the wife than in the couple
with a loan that a husband obtained on his own.  Other researchers have
found that taking out a micro-loan makes a woman more likely to partici-
pate in financial decisions with her husband and to become more assertive
in household negotiations.92  Microcredit is associated with other non-
pecuniary welfare gains, notably the use of contraceptives and women’s
control of their fertility.93  Researchers also tentatively link microcredit to
enhanced education for girls and women.94
The mixed record of microcredit becomes stronger and more encour-
aging with reference to microfinance-based reparations.  Two contrasts are
important here: first, microfinance-based reparations offers shares (i.e.
equity) in microfinance institutions, as opposed to other types of pecuni-
ary reparations;95 second, microfinance-based reparations offers
microfinance in the form of ownership instead of as microcredit.96  The
methodology of “asking the woman question”97 supports a conclusion that
although a microfinance-based reparations plan contains gender perils, it
is better for female recipients than its rivals in the pecuniary category.
Similarly, a savings account that contains money and represents an equity
stake in a financial institution gives a woman more power than she would
receive from a loan.98
90. Id. at 39– 40.
91. Id.
92. Zern-shun Adam Chen, Note, Securitizing Microcredit: The Implications of Securi-
tization for Microcredit Institutions’ Human Rights Missions, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
757, 766 (2008) (citing sources).
93. Lott, supra note 81, at 227.
94. BEATRIZ ARMENDARI´Z & JONATHAN MORDACH, THE ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE
181 (2005).
95. See infra notes 120– 124 and accompanying text. R
96. Cf. Lisa Avery, Microcredit Extension in the Wake of Conflict: Rebuilding the Lives
and Livelihoods of Women and Children Affected by War, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
205 (2005) (recommending that some humanitarian aid that international funders dis-
tribute following national conflict take the form of microcredit).
97. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837
(1990) (stating that “[f]eminists across many disciplines regularly ask a question— a set
of questions, really— known as ‘the woman question,’ which is designed to identify the
gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral
or objective.”) (internal citations omitted).
98. See Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 44– 45 (arguing that R
“[s]hares in an institution achieve [gender-progressive results] better than any other ren-
dering of money.  These shares have women’s names on them.  They implicitly contain
protection against theft and loss.  They state plainly that recipients include individual
women (or men), and are not paid only to households, families, or communities.”).
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Gender-awareness in the microfinance-reparations scheme will
increase the odds of benefiting female recipients.  If a government chooses
to make payments to existing microfinance institutions, then it ought to
look for ones with experience in allotting decision-making power to
women as stakeholders and located in places that are geographically acces-
sible to women.99  Governments that decide to launch new microfinance
institutions for this purpose should work with what one study called “gen-
der-sensitive and trained personnel,”100  Female recipients should receive
their equity shares and savings accounts with their own names on them.101
The pecuniary goal we pursue with these suggestions is to increase the
amount of money about which women make spending decisions.  The wel-
fare effects of such a shift of wealth are positive.102
II. The Mandate of International Law
As we review in this Part what international law demands with respect
to reparations, we emphasize points of consensus rather than disputed
interpretations of this remedial device.  We intend no derogation of the
varied arguments that scholars and activists have made in favor of
expanding national obligations to make reparations.103  Because we are
examining reparations as a technique already in use,104 however, rather
than a right and obligation that could be extended to new categories of
recipients, we focus on the uncontroversial requirements of international
law.
The position occupying the first section below— that reparations ought
to be paid in a pecuniary form to victims of serious human rights viola-
tions— is widely but not universally shared.  Acknowledging that interna-
tional law recognizes payments to individuals among the many modes of
reparation available to states following national crises, critics of pecuniary
reparations have expressed doubt that this form achieves real repair.105
Our argument in this section— that among the ways to distribute pecuniary
reparations, microfinance fits best with the reparative mandate of interna-
99. See Gender Approach, supra note 75, at 16 (citing a program in Mozambique
that achieved a significant increase in women’s participation by moving to marketplaces
near women’s worksites). See also Christen & Mas, supra note 51, at 278 (noting that
“[e]very time a poor person earns money there is a savings opportunity.  But it can only
be exploited if people are able to deposit (and withdraw) money near the places where
they live and work.”).
100. Gender Approach, supra note 75, at 14.
101. See Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing benefits to R
women of self-owned reparations shares).
102. See infra Part III.A.
103. For example, some writers have contended that violations need not be “serious”
or “gross” to warrant a remedy in international law; others advocate widening responsi-
bility to include more remote forms of state action like third-party interference in the
governance of another country. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 4, at 163– 64 (internal cita- R
tions omitted).
104. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (docu-
menting twentieth-century experiences with reparations).
105. See Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 10– 11 (reviewing sources). R
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tional law— may be of particular interest to readers inclined to oppose the
pecuniary mode.  The need to recognize gender in reparative schemes, dis-
cussed below in the second section, is much less controversial.
A. Pecuniary Reparations as a Technology of International Law
International law sources for the mandate of reparations are manifold.
Treaties that recognize an obligation to make, and an entitlement to receive,
reparations include the American Convention on Human Rights of
1969;106 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
1976;107 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination of 1969.108  The United Nations has issued proc-
lamations on the necessity of reparations, notably in its foundational Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.109  These sources emphasize
the uncontroversial nature of the obligation.  One resolution approved by
the General Assembly in 2006, for example, described its call for repara-
tions plans— which it suggested should include “restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition”110— as a
restatement of “existing” law, rather than the enactment of new
entitlements.111
1. The Pecuniary Aspect
Applied to human rights violations, the term “reparations” contains a
multitude of expressions and forms.  Pablo de Greiff, editor of the leading
reference work on this subject, has expanded on terms from the General
Assembly resolution just noted.  According to de Greiff, restitution refers to
restoration and reinstatement for victims; compensation refers to the steps
taken to make up for mental harm and, perhaps, “moral injury;” rehabilita-
tion covers the rendering of medical and psychological care; satisfaction is
an especially broad concept that includes such measures as apologies, ver-
ifications of facts, full disclosure of the truth, and administrative or judicial
sanctions against perpetrators; finally, guarantees of non-recurrence recog-
nize the need for future change, including the need for “institutional
reform.”112
Our focus on microfinance emphasizes the pecuniary elements of this
recitation.  We have argued elsewhere that reparations schemes that trans-
106. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, arts.
63, 68, Nov. 12, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(3)(a)– (c), Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
108. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
109. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/Res/
217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
110. G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006).
111. Id., Preamble.
112. Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,
452 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter de Greiff, Justice].
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fer wealth can achieve non-pecuniary gains for nations and societies.113
We will expand on these points below.  Here we find an imperative to make
payments to individuals in de Greiff’s warning about the dangers of “blood
money,” on one hand, and “cheap talk,” on the other.114  “Blood money”
expresses in metaphor what a payor doles out when it expends cash while
refusing to acknowledge the crisis that made such a payment morally nec-
essary.  When made by a reparations program, such a transfer not only
limits the potential effects of repair but also suggests that the state wishes
to buy passivity or silence in response to the grievances of citizens.115  We
recognize the denunciation of “blood money,” and take as given that a rep-
arations plan crafted pursuant to this Article’s recommendations would
also include non-pecuniary recognition.116
More central to this Article is the danger of “cheap talk” quasi-repara-
tions, a public display that condemns the troubled past or makes vague
promises about the bright future but withholds restitution, compensation,
and reintegration from individuals.  We have argued elsewhere at some
length that payments to individuals, apart from development-minded
spending to enhance a national economy, impart to reparations programs a
genuine recognition of past wrongs done to individuals.117  Other observ-
ers of particular initiatives have shared in this judgment, commenting on
the necessity (along with the insufficiency) of paying money in some form
to individuals whenever governments seek to declare convincingly that
they repudiate the human rights violations of the past.118
113. See sources cited supra note 6. R
114. De Greiff, Justice, supra note 112, at 461.
115. See Jaime E. Malamud-Goti & Lucas S. Grosman, Reparations and Civil Litigation:
Compensation for Human Rights Violations in Transitional Democracies, in THE HANDBOOK
OF REPARATIONS 539, 555– 56 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (reporting this perception in
Argentina when President Carlos Menem announced an administrative reparations pro-
gram shortly after announcing a pardon to human rights violators).
116. Examples of non-pecuniary gains would include an apology, a truth commis-
sion, or a public memorial.  Such non-pecuniary recognition has become customary in
reparations programs. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Book Review, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 233,
233 (2008) (noting that more than thirty truth commissions have been formed following
national conflicts) [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Book Review].
117. Seibel with Armstrong, supra note 6, at 686 (warning of “development policies R
that masquerade as reparations programs” and noting that “governments will signifi-
cantly harm the political and social aims of reparations if they substitute the provision
of clean water for reparations programs.”); Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note
6, at 11 (arguing that payments to individuals establish “ledgers” that “affirm an ideal of R
governmental responsibility.”).
118. See, e.g., Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Macro and Micro: A Psychological Per-
spective on Reparation in Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 560,
567 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (noting that “[t]here is research to show that many vic-
tims (of criminal violence) want reparations in the form of a sincere apology from their
offender, as well as compensation from them for damages”); Ruth Rubio-Mar´ın, Gender
and Collective Reparations in the Aftermath of Conflict and Political Repression, in THE
GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 381, 396– 99 (Ruth Rubio-Mar´ın ed., 2009) (describing different
modes of pecuniary investment that a government could use in order to create recogni-
tion of harms to women as a group); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese
American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 517– 18 (1998)
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Advocating reparations in the form of microfinance, we continue our
response to pecuniary-skeptics— writers who have noted the shortcomings
of money as a medium of repair119— by distinguishing shares in
microfinance institutions, which constitute ownership, from the cash pay-
ments that these critics have in mind when they fault pecuniary schemes.
We share many of the familiar misgivings about one-off transfers as a mode
of reparation.  Safety is a major difficulty.  With an estimated 2.5 billion
adults around the world lacking access to banks,120 many persons have no
secure place to store a disbursement from their government.  In the past,
solitary cash payments distributed as reparations have generally been too
small to change the life conditions of recipients yet big enough to provoke
resentments, strife, and money-grabbing by friends and relatives.121
One-off payments can be particularly dangerous and unavailing to
women.  Post-conflict economic crises can cut women off from whatever
access to banks they may have had, make their possession of cash riskier,
and worsen poverty in the nation, which in turn can increase the likelihood
that male relatives or partners of these recipients would take the monies
paid to women for their own use.  Furthermore, certain national laws and
customs do not recognize full rights of women to hold traditional forms of
property like land or livestock,122 making it harder for women to turn their
cash into something they want to own and are able to control.  Gender
aside, even if recipients can hold onto their one-off payments long enough
to spend them on things they like and value, their benefits to individuals—
not to mention society at large— is likely to be short-lived and far from
sustainable.123  A one-off direct payment will have little effect on reintegra-
tion or rehabilitation.124  It does not invite a recipient into governance,
democratic deliberation, or civic life.
(reporting that although Japanese-American recipients of pecuniary reparations did not
experience these payments as compensation for their “lost freedom, property, liveli-
hood, or the stigma of disloyalty,” they believed that the appropriation of money showed
that the U.S. government sincerely sought repair) (internal citations omitted).
119. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 118, at 520– 21 (noting, for example, that “mone- R
tary compensation . . . is not, alone, deemed sufficiently reparatory by most
Hawaiians.”).
120. See Schenker, supra note 61.
121. Roht-Arriaza, Book Review, supra note 116, at 237.
122. See, e.g., Jamie Crook, Comment, Promoting Peace and Security in Rwanda
Through Fair and Equitable Land Rights, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1487, 1505 (2006) (describing
laws and customs whose effects persist in sub-Saharan Africa). See also Rachel
Rebouche´, Note, Labor, Land, and Women’s Rights in Africa:  Challenges for the New Pro-
tocol on the Rights of Women, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 235, 236– 37 (2004) (stating that
women’s rights are framed as “family protection” or otherwise broad non-discrimination
terms that do not expressly protect the property and economic rights of women, and
that the African Union “fails to support or adequately fund its women’s rights initia-
tives.”).  Laws and customs that impede travel have a similar effect on the ability of
women to achieve gains from reparations payments.
123. Seibel, Reparations Shareholders, supra note 6, at 1. R
124. See Rubio-Mar´ın, Transitional Societies, supra note 15, at 109– 13 (emphasizing R
these goals).
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2. Individual and Collective Justice
At a policy level, one central difficulty for reparations following a
national crisis is the tension between two very different goals: individual
justice and collective justice.  On one hand, victims who have experienced
serious human rights violations in a time of national crisis were hurt as
individuals, with each person experiencing trauma in a unique way.  On
the other hand, victims also suffered as members of groups or social
aggregates.125
A focus on individual justice must strain to include the communal,
tribal, familial, and national elements of the suffering being recognized.
The alternative, a focus on collective justice, contains these recognitions
but lacks particular attention to the unique human being who experienced
a human rights violation.  Plans that distribute money or social supports to
individuals based on specific past acts of official wrongdoing rather than
on citizens’ needs or macroeconomic national policy sow dissention when
politicians have to choose between dishonoring the wrong (“You, citizen,
may not receive any reparation for the violation of your human rights
because there will not be enough hospitals, or schools, or housing to go
around if we pay you.”) and dishonoring claims for subsistence (“You, citi-
zen, may not have access to the hospital, or school, or housing you need
because we had to spend our money on reparations to note wrongdoing
that injured a different citizen.”).126
The remedial difficulty of honoring both individual and collective
harm becomes explicit when the planning nation tries to state exactly what
it is trying to repair.  In her analysis of reparations in Peru, published soon
after that nation’s plan was announced in 2003, Lisa Magarrell broached
what she called “the question of consequences vs. violations as a starting
point.”127  This dichotomy overlaps with the more familiar contrast
between individual and collective justice but adds a tension of its own.
Magarrell, who worked with the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission to devise a reparations scheme, reports that the Commission
shifted away from consequences, which in a poor country proved too hard
to separate from wider social problems.128  Focusing on violations raised
problems of its own.  Magarrell noted that the “most politically attractive”
features in the reparations scheme are “those that look like development
programs, and that— either coincidentally or purposefully— thus lose some
of their reparative force.”129
125. See, e.g., Max du Plessis, Reparations and International Law:  How are Reparations
to be Determined (Past Wrong or Current Effects), Against Whom, and What Form Should
They Take?, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 41, 54 (2003) (reviewing the dilemma with
reference to slavery reparations in the United States).
126. This response arose in Peru. See Magarrell, supra note 18, at 93– 94. R
127. Id. at 91.
128. Id. at 93– 95.
129. Id. at 97.  Magarrell’s observation was prescient.  As of 2009, five years after the
publication of her paper, the Peruvian government had appropriated only a small por-
tion of the funds needed to execute its reparations plan. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONI-
TORING CENTRE, PERU: REPARATIONS BEGIN BUT IDPS EXCLUDED 6 (2009), available at http:/
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It becomes tempting at this point to throw up one’s hands and aban-
don pecuniary reparations as incoherent and impossible.  Like the gap
between individual and collective justice, the gap between wrongdoing and
consequences indicates that by at least one of these measurements, pecuni-
ary reparations will always price the injury wrong and fail to attain full
repair.  Responses to human rights violations distributed in a form that
does not include payouts to individuals conveniently escape the individual-
collective problem in a way that our pecuniary mode of reparations cannot
achieve.  A truth commission, for example, can have a plenary agenda to
uncover and account for wrongs at many levels.  Pablo de Greiff’s “cheap
talk,” being cheap, can usually be lavished on yet another individual or
group at little marginal cost.  Pecuniary reparations, however— whether
made in the form of one-off payments, investments in national develop-
ment, the microfinance approach that we advocate here, or any other
mode— all operate under the precept of scarcity.  Each expenditure neces-
sarily precludes another when resources are finite, making it impossible to
deploy all feasible methods of repair at once.  Instead of despairing, how-
ever, we find in this discussion an outline of what a pecuniary reparations
plan ought to provide.
We start by repeating the warning about cheap talk.  Words alone do
not affect repair.  Next, we note individual and collective justice as pursued
by historically recent reparations plans.  Nations typically do not pay out
reparations money pursuant to both individual complaints in their courts
and a centralized administrative scheme.  Most countries that have imple-
mented pecuniary reparations have favored standardized payments.  This
choice emphasizes collective rather than individual justice.130  Consistent
with these experiences, we agree that national governments undertaking
reparations must install a centralized administrative scheme rather than
limit redress to independent individual initiative.  In relatively wealthy
countries, claimants may have access not only to these centralized adminis-
trative schemes but also to courts that use tort principles of responsibility
and redress to evaluate the harm that claimants suffered as individuals.
When national governments pay out reparations to social aggregates, how-
ever, they cannot apply tort reasoning to form individually tailored
remedies.131
Carrying out the mandates of international law would aggregate cate-
gories of injuries and claimants and attempt, within this aggregation, to
treat like cases alike.132  At the same time, a reparations program that sets
/www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/EA59E9CD1071
F245C125753800520C76/$file/Peru_Overview_Jan09.pdf.
130. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 4, at 165– 77 (reviewing reparations debates in Argen- R
tina and describing a successful tort claim, brought by Daniel Tarnopolsky, as well as a
centralized governmental reparation scheme).
131. Malamud-Goti & Grosman, supra note 115, at 551 (arguing that ideally the
nation undertaking reparations should provide both administrative compensation and
access to courts that apply tort principles).
132. The tension between consequences and violations means that the principle of
“like cases alike” will necessarily invite debate over which classification outweighs the
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out to repair human rights violations ought to provide for the initiative and
freedom of individuals.  This measure of individual justice offers gains to
welfare, because when a government program can be described credibly as
not just reparations but national economic development, it becomes easier
for politicians to enact, finance, and defend.133
Pecuniary transfers that are less liquid than cash, and less familiar to
recipients than the chattels that one-off payments can buy, add a collective-
justice element to an individual’s transfer payment.  A pecuniary repara-
tions scheme whose payments are relatively illiquid prevents recipients
from consuming their payments as quickly as they might wish, but offers
benefits that outweigh this deficiency.  At the individual level, illiquidity
enhances the security of the conveyance and thus the likelihood that each
recipient will be able to enjoy it.  At the collective level, recipients pool and
leverage their payments in ways relatively likely to increase wealth and
improve social conditions.
B. Integrating Gender Justice into Reparative Schemes: The Mandate,
Continued
Gender awareness makes the desired outcomes of a reparations plan—
gains for both individuals and collectives— more likely to ensue.  In these
observations about gender, we continue our focus on the non-controversial
precepts of international law and thus pass over numerous debates in the
reparations literature, including whether sex discrimination violates inter-
national law,134 whether nations need to take extra steps to ensure
women’s access to pecuniary modes of redress,135 and whether women are
entitled to recompense for “indirect” or “secondary” harms relating to
harms that their partners or children suffered.136  In other words, we do
not join discussions over what types of affronts constitute actionable viola-
tions; we assume instead that reparations planners have resolved the defini-
tional task of which injuries to cover.
That national reparations plans must recognize the experiences and
the human agency of female citizen-recipients has, at least at the level of
principle, no opposition.  Resolutions adopted by the United Nations
Security Council over the past decade have declared the necessity of includ-
ing women as participants when nations rebuild after conflict.  Supersed-
other.  This problem, however, is present in any approach that mixes law and justice.
On the presence of the principle of “like cases alike” in world law, see Olav A. Haazen,
Precedent in the World Court, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 587, 599 (1997) (book review) (arguing
that this principle is part of international law). See also Frederick Schauer, Why Prece-
dent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 PERSP.
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 454, 458 (2008) (arguing that the principle is Aristotelian in origin).
133. See generally Roht-Arriaza, Book Review, supra note 116, at 238 (arguing that
“[g]overnments tend to like the idea of collective reparations because they are easier to
fold into more general development programs and because they allow the government to
downplay the political significance of reparations.”); Magarrell, supra note 18, at 97. R
134. Rubio-Mar´ın, Transitional Societies, supra note 15, at 83– 84 (summarizing points R
of disagreement).
135. Id. at 106.
136. Id. at 91– 93.
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ing an older conception of women as victims and vulnerable subgroups,
these instruments put women at the center of repair work, making women
subjects, and not just the passive objects of the actions of others.
The first (and most innovative) of the series, Security Council Resolu-
tion 1325, continued an agenda of gender mainstreaming that had started
at the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.137  Resolution 1325
insisted on the inclusion of women in peace-brokering even when women
are not direct parties to the conflict.  Translated into a hundred languages,
this document made its way successfully into other applications, including
petitions by women for expenditures and national implementation legisla-
tion.138  Successor resolutions by the Security Council built on the ambi-
tion of Resolution 1325 by adding measures to ensure accountability,139
calls for “redress” for harms to women’s human rights,140 and reminders to
heed the socio-economic claims and needs of women in post-conflict pro-
grams.141  Calls for gender quotas and parity in international assemblies
remind participants of what women contribute as leaders and decision-
makers.142
During the last decade, the General Assembly of the United Nations
joined in this endorsement of women as subjects and participants in post-
conflict repair.143  In 2003, for the first time, it mandated the preparation
of an in-depth study of violence against women and the identification of
best practices to address prevention and repair.144  Its elaborate “Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” adopted in 2005,
included a non-discrimination clause and several references to the harms
that women experience in wide-scale violations of international human
rights.145
The agenda of mainstreaming women’s claims and experiences moves
forward when international law connects them to universal principles.
When the International Criminal Court recognized rape “as a war crime, a
137. For information on the Fourth World Conference on Women, see generally Dar-
ren Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender: Why International Law Theory Should Adopt Com-
parative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 759 (2007).  On the relation of Resolution
1325 to that Conference, see Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with
International Law through the UN Security Council, 32 AUSTL. FEMINIST L. J.  97, 100
(2010).
138. Otto, supra note 137, at 101, 104.
139. S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
140. S.C. Res. 1888, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009).  This resolution was
drafted by the United States. See Dulcie Leimbach, A New U.N. Resolution Zeroes In on
Rape as a Weapon, UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION WORLD BULLETIN (Oct. 7, 2009), http://
www.unausa.org/worldbulletin/clinton/women.
141. S.C. Res. 1889, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009).
142. See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 137, at 799– 800 (discussing examples from R
France and Brazil of actions taken to encourage female representation in politics).
143. See G.A. Res. 58/142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/142 (Feb. 10, 2004).
144. U.N. Secretary-General, In-depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women,
¶¶ 6– 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add. 1 (July 6, 2006).
145. G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶¶ 20– 25, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006).
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crime against humanity, and an act of genocide,”146 it widened classifica-
tions that in the past had implicitly barred women.  Similarly, women lead-
ers were central to the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, making a deep imprint there.  For example, women
in leadership positions noticed early on how few women had testified at
other tribunals, and took steps to recruit female witnesses.147  These
women spoke effectively not only about rape, a subject on which they were
expected to testify, but a range of experiences and encounters.148
If international law has progressed by, inter alia, demonstrating the
ways in which women and men are not different from each other, then
policymakers heeding the mandate of international law ought to extend the
mainstreaming mandate initiated in Beijing at the World Conference that
continues through international law instruments and institutions.  A repa-
rations scheme that establishes women as stakeholders— and also transfers
money for them to own and control— advances that agenda.  Women who
manage their property demonstrate that the power to save, spend, and
invest assets belongs to all human beings, regardless of gender.
III. Macroeconomic Gains in Post-Conflict Nation-Building
A wide-scale distribution of financial resources in the form of shares
in microfinance institutions can enlarge a nation’s economy.  Financial
development has reparative effects of its own: it “reduces income inequality
in general,” and “has a disproportionately positive impact on the income of
the poor. . . .”149  Women as distributees are central to this advantage:
researchers have documented the wealth and welfare effects of putting
money in the hands of women.150  Around the world, female borrowers
have leveraged small loans to build a degree of prosperity.151  Shifting from
microcredit to the outright-transfers version of microfinance that this Arti-
cle recommends would make good use of the wealth-creating tendencies of
microcredit, while greatly reducing the drawbacks that expansive debt
installs.
146. Beth Van Schaack, Obstacles on the Road to Gender Justice: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as Object Lesson, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 361,
370 (2009).
147. Julie Mertus, When the Fighting Stops: When Adding Women Matters: Women’s
Participation in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1297, 1309– 13 (2008).
148. Id. at 1309.
149. Formalizing Microsavings, supra note 28, at 2. R
150. See generally M. Shahe Emran, A.K.M. Mahbub Morshed & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Microfinance and Missing Markets (Mar. 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1001309 (explaining the extraordinary success of
microcredit with reference to its repair of flawed labor markets that exclude participa-
tion by women).
151. Isobel Coleman, The Better Half: Helping Women Help the World, 89 FOREIGN AFF.
126, 128 (2010) (noting that “[t]oday, most microfinance organizations also explicitly
focus on women— not only because women are statistically more likely to be poor than
men but also because women tend to use any marginal increases in their incomes to
invest in their families’ nutrition, health, and education.”).
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Furthermore, microfinance offers a conduit to attract funding for repa-
rations from a class of under-tapped potential benefactors: entrepreneur-
funders who live outside the nation.152  Monies that these individuals
donate to or invest in a reparations program would, ceteris paribus,
increase its salutary effects.153  To be sure, wealthy persons who earned
their fortunes through commercial innovation and risk-taking might also
admire other proposals that compete for their attention— not only one-off
cash transfers, but also investments in national infrastructure, such as the
funding of hospitals or schools, which some observers believe can be a
form of reparation.154  Only a microfinance program like the one we pro-
pose in this Article, however, would extend to these donors the so-called
sincerest flattery of emulating them.155  Because taking an entrepreneurial
approach to reparations identifies a nation as committed to market-ori-
ented economic growth as well as non-pecuniary healing for its citizens,
this strategy would welcome foreign for-profit investors along with philan-
thropists to its circle of funders.  Less wealthy individuals could participate
as both donors and investors, contributing less money per capita but
widening a transnational base of support in the aggregate.
The microfinance-reparations strategy recommended in this Article
offers promise to the development of vulnerable post-conflict national
economies.  Recall the two central aspects of our proposal: first, transfers
of shares and deposits in financial institutions (in contrast to two alterna-
tives: investments in national development, such as the construction of
clinics or schools, or loans that borrowers must agree to repay) and, sec-
ond, attention to the inclusion and participation of female recipients.  As
we detail in the first section below, putting money in the hands of women
has salubrious effects on the economy of a nation.  The version of
microfinance that we advocate avoids the major perils of expanding debt
for poor people.  The second section explores the appeal of microfinance as
a source of support at the foreign-individual level for a national reparations
scheme.
A. National Economic Development
1. Gendered Returns on Investment
Demographers, development economists, and other social scientists
have reported that transferring control over money to women enhances the
152. For an overview of the funding difficulty, see generally Alexander Segovia,
Financing Reparations Programs, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 650 (Pablo de Greiff
ed., 2006).
153. See generally Yunus, Donor Funds, supra note 66.
154. See supra note 3 (noting the possibility that governments will describe their R
spending on infrastructure as reparations).  An example of a funder that supports both
microfinance and non-microfinance projects is the Gates Foundation, which invests in
health care and preventative medicine. See Programs & Partnerships, http://www.gates
foundation.org/programs/Pages/overview.aspx, THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010). See also infra note 197 and accompanying text. R
155. See CHARLES CALEB COLTON, LACON: OR, MANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS; ADDRESSED
TO THOSE WHO THINK 113 (1837).
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welfare of children, the nation’s next generation.156  In hungry countries,
children gain more of the calories they need to live when women gain more
money vis-a`-vis men.157  As a general rule, low-income men spend at least
part of their income on their own pleasure, as consumers, whereas low-
income women tend to contribute their entire income to their house-
holds.158  This generalization was tested in 2010 when a deadly earth-
quake struck Haiti.  Relief workers distributing United Nations World Food
Program coupons chose to give the coupons only to women after they wit-
nessed men pushing to the head of food lineups.  Consistent with what
more formal research has found, these workers concluded that women
nourished their families more reliably than men.159
As mentioned above, researchers who study microcredit have found
that access to microfinance increases the use of contraceptives and is
linked to gains in female literacy.160  More generally and to the same point,
a study reporting on microfinance in Africa reported that “women reinvest
in their communities at greater rates than men— at 89 cents on the dollar
versus 60 cents, respectively. . . .”161  Similar evidence about the social
value of shifting power to women emerges from the record in affluent
nation-states, where civic power in the hands of women generates socially
useful results, both in tranquil times and when turmoil strikes.  Female
legislators in the United States and Europe are more likely than their male
counterparts to introduce child-friendly expenditure bills.162  American
policymakers who regard the advancement of women as desirable in
itself— independent of whether children do better, based on the benefits of
full citizenship for women— have taken advantage of crises to encourage
gender-progressive social investments.163  Directing transfer payments to
the control of women yields gains to the repairing national government.164
156. See Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 48– 50. R
157. Id. (reporting studies in Kenya, Jamaica, and Brazil).
158. See Lott, supra note 81, at 226– 27 (reviewing studies). R
159. Women-Only Food Sites Open in Haiti, (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.cbc.ca/world/
story/2010/01/31/haiti-women-food.html.
160. See Lott, supra note 81, at 227– 28.
161. Sarita Gupta, Microfinance in Africa: Harnessing the Potential of a Continent, 9
MICROFINANCE INSIGHTS 12, 14 (2008).
162. Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 49 (internal citations omitted). R
163. For example, when the American government was planning a stimulus aimed at
easing a severe recession, one editorial urged that this money be directed toward increas-
ing and enhancing women’s employment.  Linda Hirshman, Where Are the New Jobs for
Women?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at A35.  In a follow-up essay the author reported that
after the publication of her editorial “the [stimulus] package improved for women,”
although she did not take the credit.  Linda Hirshman, Are Women’s Blogs Afraid of
Math?, SLATE (May 26, 2009), http://www.doublex.com/section/work/introducing-prin-
cess-column-linda-hirshman.  Another example: in New York, when 343 fire department
workers lost their lives in the September 11th terrorist attacks, the feminist law reform
group Legal Momentum found “an opportunity to reform an ‘infamously’ sexist city
agency.”  They worked to gather women to take the firefighter tests and obtained dona-
tions of space for women to practice.  A  record number of women became firefighters.
Dana Goldstein, Pink-Collar Blues, THE AM. PROSPECT, June 2009, at 19, 21.
164. See generally Beth Goldblatt, Evaluating the Gender Content of Reparations: Les-
sons from South Africa, in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN? GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR
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2. Returns from Microfinance
In its announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, the Norwegian
Nobel Committee asserted that microcredit is a way for large groups of
people to “break out of poverty.”  “Development from below. . . serves to
advance democracy and human rights,”165 the announcement added.  The
Nobel Committee was expressing what had become close to a conventional
wisdom: “millions for millions.”166
To listeners with a skeptical cast of mind, bold claims like this one
tend to invite resistance: Really? Is that so?  Even before the Nobel trumpet
sounded, many writers had doubted that the route to prosperity for poor
people is to borrow money, typically at a high interest rate.167  In recogni-
tion of this cautionary literature, we proceed with care as we identify
returns from microfinance.
A recent report published by Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP), the policy and research group housed at the World Bank, gathers
the record under the rubric of a blunt question: “Does Microcredit Really
Help Poor People?”168  Our review of the evidence as it has been presented
in the CGAP report and elsewhere finds that microcredit has generated
wealth and welfare gains for poor people around the world.  The effect is
more modest than some microcredit-enthusiasts have claimed but it
exists.169  We next explore the distinction between microcredit as loans
and microfinance as we propose it here: transfer payments in the form of
shares in financial institutions.  The drawbacks of being indebted may be
present for borrower-clients of microfinance institutions, but transfers to
recipients-owners of such institutions do not burden these individuals with
risks associated with debt and thus largely escape the detrimental effects
of microcredit.
We extend our skepticism to anecdotes, and recommend parsimony
and caution in generalizing about what a microfinance intervention can
do.  As Esther Duflo, a recipient of several honors for pioneering work on
the development of vulnerable economies,170 has demonstrated through
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 48 (Ruth Rubio-Mar´ın ed. 2006).  For a particular example of
directing money to women, see id. at 73– 74 (reporting that South Africa implementers
of reparations give to women funds intended for children “in the belief that this money
would actually reach the family, because men sometimes misuse it and often are not the
actual custodians of the children.”).
165. See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006
(Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/
press.html.
166. See generally Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30,
2006, at 62.
167. See supra notes 66, 71 and accompanying text. R
168. RICHARD ROSENBERG, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR, FOCUS NOTE NO.
59, DOES MICROCREDIT REALLY HELP POOR PEOPLE?, available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/
document-1.9.41443/FN59.pdf.
169. The basic lesson is that while microcredit can have beneficial effects, borrowers
who fail to repay their loans do not share them. See generally BATEMAN, supra note 58.
170. Among other honors Duflo has been awarded a MacArthur “genius” grant and
the Clark Medal, which often presages Nobel recognition for economists. See Press
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her Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, rival
approaches toward increasing wealth and welfare can and should be tested
through the same kind of randomized studies that regulators demand to
prove the efficacy of new pharmaceuticals.171  This technique provides val-
uable evidence about the value of interventions.172  Scarcity always necessi-
tates prudence in government spending to increase welfare, and the fraught
political context of post-conflict reparations makes such prudence even
more important.
Following decades of anecdotal information about the supposed
power of microcredit— plucky women receive tiny loans, open small busi-
nesses, attain prosperity, and enhance their villages— researchers have
tried to measure the effects of both microcredit in particular and
microfinance in general through randomized controlled trials.  Dean
Karlan and Jonathan Zinman, for example, studied microcredit in South
Africa by randomly prompting loan officers to approve half the loan appli-
cations from a population that would normally be turned down, and then
examining these borrowers to see how they fared after they received their
loan offers.173  Another randomized and controlled trial that pertains more
closely to the reparations proposal of this Article was published by the MIT
Poverty Action Lab in 2009.  In that study, researchers assembled one hun-
dred and four slums in Hyderabad and opened a microfinance bank in half
of them, based on a random selection.  A year and a half later, they found
modest effects: the introduction of microfinance institutions had no impact
on health, education, or women’s outcomes, but did lead to increases in
new business and in the profitability of existing businesses.174
In 2009, researchers at the World Bank reported on an extraordinary
data set that arose in Mexico;175 though not a controlled study, this event
Release, Peter Dizikes, Esther Duflo Wins Clark Medal (Apr. 23, 2010), available at
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2010/duflo-clark-0423.html.
171. Id.
172. As a founding editor of the American Economics Journal: Applied Economics,
Duflo has helped to facilitate research reporting empirical measurements and analysis of
interventions to increase social welfare. See Esther Duflo, http://www.povertyactionlab.
org/duflo (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  For a sample of findings published in that jour-
nal, compare Benjamin A. Olken, Do Television and Radio Destroy Social Capital?  Evidence
from Indonesian Villages, 1 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1 (2009) (concluding that
increased television and radio signal reception relates inversely to social trust) with
Emily Oster & Rebecca Thornton, Menstruation, Sanitary Products and School Attend-
ance: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation, 3 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 91 (2011)
(reporting that, contrary to anecdotes, menstruation has only a tiny effect on girls’
attendance at school in poor countries and that distributing sanitary products has no
effect on attendance).
173. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized
Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 433 (2010).
174. Abhijit Banerjee et al., The Miracle of Microfinance?  Evidence from a Randomized
Evaluation 12– 14 (The Institute for Financial Management and Research, Centre for
Micro Finance Working Paper Series No. 31, 2009), available at http://ifmr.ac.in/cmf/
publications/wp/2009/31_Banerjee_Miracle_of_Microfinance.pdf.
175. Miriam Bruhn & Inessa Love, The Economic Impact of Banking the Unbanked:
Evidence from Mexico (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4981, 2009),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/4981.html.
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presented many of the virtues of this device.  A large retailer of consumer
goods called Grupo Elektra received a charter that enabled it to go into the
banking business.  Grupo Elektra decided to house a subsidiary bank in all
of its stores.  In October 2002 it launched 815 branches of its new Banco
Azteca, setting a world record for the most bank branches opened at once.
Banco Azteca featured “low documentation requirements,” “motorcycle-rid-
ing loan officers that come to the borrower’s house,” and modestly sized
loans, making it comparable to existing microfinance institutions.176  Data
gathered by the Mexican federal government in its National Employment
Survey— on employment levels and income received from labor in both for-
mal and informal markets— enabled the researchers to compare
macroeconomic indicators in municipalities with Banco Azteca branches to
municipalities that lacked access to microcredit.  The World Bank found
gains in the municipalities with branches, noting that the opening of a
Banco Azteca branch led to an increase of 7.6% in the number of informal
business owners, an increase of 1.4% in total employment, and an increase
in average income of about 7%.177
These effects resulted from the extension of microcredit, of course,
rather than the version of microfinance we advocate.  Paying reparations as
shares in financial institutions, the proposal of this Article, promises to do
more than what researchers have reported about microcredit as provided in
controlled or quasi-controlled settings like the Banco Azteca experience.
Our premise is that the three gains from our plan for microfinance-based
reparations— a safe place for savings for people who have previously lacked
it, an expansion of the money available for loans, and increased opportuni-
ties for nation-building via social solidarity178— add up to more than what
a commercial bank can render, because commercial banks might not offer
self-help to individuals and the repair that emerges from the networks they
build.179
B. External Donor-Investor Participation
Writing about reparations from a United States domestic perspective,
the economist and legal scholar Saul Levmore proposed a reparations
176. Id. at 2.
177. Id. at 3.
178. See supra Part I.A.
179. For reparations purposes, the curative effect of expanded credit reaches fun-
damentally into a victim’s well-being.  The word ‘victim,’ the source of her enti-
tlement to become a shareholder, loses its hold as this citizen moves to
bankability.  Shakespeare notwithstanding, any person who may both ‘a bor-
rower . . . [and] a lender be’ is more autonomous, more likely to enjoy both self-
respect and the respect of others, than a person shut out of both roles.  As they
become investors, reconstructors, and rebuilders of the social tissue, these share-
holders gain in relative social status, and by their work and risk-taking they earn
this gain.
Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 27– 28 (internal citations omitted). R
On the relationship between microfinance institutions and the development of self-help
networks, see supra notes 66– 71 and accompanying text.
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scheme for African Americans modeled in part on philanthropy.  He
described his idea as follows:
The plan is to ask for donors.  It is to suggest to donors that, as with so many
other things undertaken in this country, individual and corporate volunteers
can, in the aggregate, accomplish important objectives that might fail or be
done less effectively if entirely public in nature.180
Under the Levmore plan, taxpayers would decide whether, and how much,
to contribute to two reparations schemes whose provisions would be laid
out by Congress.
Levmore’s article, pertinently titled Privatizing Reparations, relates to
our recommendations about reparations through microfinance.  Recogni-
tion of the private sector can augment a national reparations program in a
post-conflict setting.  We do not explicitly “ask for donors,” but instead
suggest a mode that welcomes and facilitates participation from benefac-
tors outside the national government.  The diaspora already excels at remit-
tances.181  It might well respond positively to a call to contribute to
reparations paid in the form of microfinance shares and deposit accounts
of beneficiaries.182
Historical experiences with pecuniary reparations underscore the
importance of attracting external funding.  The best-known pecuniary rep-
arations schemes following national crises originated in wealthier coun-
tries that could pay the bill: Germany after World War II and, much lower
on the gross domestic product hierarchy but still relatively prosperous,
Argentina and Chile.183  Pecuniary reparations plans legislated in poorer
countries have gone on to fail for lack of funds.184  Financial need is not
the only reason for a country to seek reparations money from outside its
borders.  A claim of justice will at least occasionally accompany the reach
toward external financing because “foreign actors [may have] supported
the military regimes or participated directly in the internal conflicts of
societies in transition.”185
Summing up the problem of financing reparations, the development
economist Alexander Segovia concludes that foreign support for national
180. Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1291, 1302– 03 (2004).
181. See, e.g., Sergio Dı´az-Briquets, Remittances to Cuba: An Update, 18 CUBA IN TRAN-
SITION 154 available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/volume18/pdfs/diaz-
briquets.pdf (describing remittances of the Cuban diaspora).
182. The Truth Commission of El Salvador proposed a reparations scheme to be
financed mostly by foreign sources, and “most truth commissions have in their recom-
mendations called on the international community to help finance reparations.”  Sego-
via, supra note 152, at 659.  We extend these precedents by moving beyond national R
governments and international aid organizations to individuals and the resources they
control.
183. Roht-Arriaza, Book Review, supra note 115, at 234– 35.
184. Segovia, supra note 152, at 665 (observing that reparations plans lacked suffi- R
cient funds to carry out the recommendations of truth commissions in El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Haiti, Malawi, and South Africa).  The budget for reparations in Haiti, too much
for the country to pay, had been only about $3,500,000.  Bernstein, Pecuniary Repara-
tions, supra note 6, at 15 (internal citations omitted). R
185. Segovia, supra note 152, at 659.
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reparations programs— like pecuniary reparations generally— is usually
necessary but not sufficient.  Foreign-originated monies “should be consid-
ered a complement to national resources, but never as substitutes.”186
Planners of reparations schemes must also “find new mechanisms of coop-
eration that enable the community to finance reparations, at least in
part.”187  As examples of these “new mechanisms,” Segovia notes that for-
eign governments might forgive debt or aid in confiscating and repatriating
stolen assets.188
The pursuit of “new mechanisms” to fund reparations goes further
when extended beyond foreign national governments and into the interna-
tional financial community, which has manifested its commitment to
microfinance.189  To date, “foreign contributions for financing reparations
have been fairly modest, and in most cases disappointing.”190  The private
sector lies mostly untapped.
Among the alternative modes of financing a reparations plan, the
microfinance apparatus is likely to attract more support from foreign
donors than traditional modes of pecuniary reparation have attained.
With its large number of wealthy individual citizens and a strong tradition
of private philanthropy, the United States offers a concentration of poten-
tial donors that could be tapped while the consensus about the importance
of transnational imperatives builds.191  Reparations planners raising funds
should consider the manifested inclinations of this population.
Prominent American entrepreneur-benefactors have found micro-
finance an attractive medium for charitable giving.  George Soros started
the Economic and Business Development Program to help “emerging econ-
omies . . . achieve prosperity and sustainability through microfinance” and
other initiatives.192  The founder of eBay and his wife donated $100 mil-
lion to their alma mater, Tufts University, in 2005 to launch the Omidyar-
Tufts Microfinance Fund.193  Several years before winning the Nobel Prize
186. Id.
187. Id. at 671.
188. Id.
189. For example, development agencies and private foundations founded CGAP, the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, housed at the World Bank to focus on
microfinance. See http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/aboutus/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
A newsletter available in full only to paying subscribers, the MicroCapital Monitor, has
been commenting on worldwide microfinance capital markets since 2005. See http://
www.microcapital.org/microcapital-monitor (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
190. Segovia, supra note 152, at 659.
191. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Billionaires’ Pledge to Give Away Half Gains Followers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A15.  On the American tradition of private philanthropy, see
generally AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY (Daniel J. Boorstin, ed., 2d ed. 1988).
192. Greer J. McPhaden, Billionaire Philanthropy: Seasoned Capitalists Helping Entre-
preneurs, GLOBAL ENVISION (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.globalenvision.org/library/12/
122 [hereinafter Billionaire Philanthropy].
193. See TUFTS UNIV., http://www.tufts.edu/microfinancefund/ (last visited Oct. 22,
2010).  Among “American entrepreneur-donors” we include Pierre Omidyar, who is not
universally regarded as American. See Salar Golestanian, The Richest Iranian in the
World, BRITISH-IRANIAN BUS. NEWS (last visited Oct. 22, 2010), http://www1.bibauk.com/
Topics/Technology/Internet/tabid/172/Default.aspx.  He has lived in the United States
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in 2006, the Grameen Foundation received a two-million dollar gift from
the wireless-communication tycoon Craig McCaw.194  Ted Turner’s pledge
of a billion dollars to the United Nations Foundation included funding for
entrepreneurship, including the African Rural Energy Development Initia-
tive, which has focused on new businesses that develop sustainable
energy.195  The Michael and Susan Dell Foundation, financed by a per-
sonal-computer fortune, has focused on providing startup capital to entre-
preneurs in what it calls “six urban slums” in India.196  Another funder,
billionaire Bill Gates, has expressed keen support for microfinance.197
Individuals like these who have amassed wealth while implementing
their own plans have experienced the connection among personal ambi-
tion, economic clout, and social improvement that planners would pursue
in microfinance-based reparations.198  Prospective donors to reparations
programs who have made money in commerce and industry thus would
likely agree with journalists Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn who, in
their bestseller on development, praised microfinance as a uniquely potent
social instrument: “Capitalism, it turns out, can achieve what charity and
good intentions sometimes cannot.”199  Uplift without abasement evokes
Adam Smith’s reminder that “[n]obody but a beggar” would choose “to
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”200
Groups of individuals with some money to spare— necessarily a larger
group than the mega-rich benefactors mentioned above— have manifested
since the age of six, however, and made his fortune in northern California. See Jim
McClellan, Going, Going, Strong, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 1999, at 14.
194. Billionaire Philanthropy, supra note 192.
195. Id.
196. Press Release, Michael & Susan Dell Foundation, Microfinance: Services the
Poor Can Bank on (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.msdf.org/Newsroom/
Press_Releases/06-05-02/Microfinance_Services_the_Poor_Can_Bank_On.aspx.
197. See Michael Warmington, Gates Foundation Names Robert Peck Christen of the
Boulder Institute of Microfinance as Head of Microfinance Team, (Apr. 13, 2007), MICRO-
CAPITAL MONITOR, http://www.microcapitalmonitor.com/cblog/index.php?/archives/
756-Gates-Foundation-Names-Robert-Peck-Christen-of-the-Boulder-Institute-of-
Microfinance-as-Head-of-Microfinance-Team.html#extended (reporting on microfinance
in the Gates Foundation’s Financial Services for the Poor Initiative).  At the end of a
2008 speech, Gates took a question about microfinance from the CEO of the multina-
tional World Data Ventures.  In response, Gates articulated his view that all businesses
should pursue “creative capitalism,” which entails identifying how these businesses
might adapt “their products or expertise to help the poorest.”  Bill Gates, Remarks at
Government Leaders Forum Americas 2008 (Apr. 4, 2008) (transcript available at http:/
/www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008/04-04GLFAmericas.mspx).
Gates made an analogy: for “food companies, it’s about micronutrients,” but “[f]or the
banks, it’s about microfinance for the poor.” Id.  Finally, Gates added another reason
that businesses should focus on “the poorest”:  talented younger workers prefer employ-
ers who are “pioneering” to ease poverty. Id.
198. For darker commentary of this point, describing enthusiasm for microfinance as
ideology about bootstrapping, see Dyal-Chand, supra note 71, at 231– 32; see also BATE-
MAN, supra note 58, at 160– 64 (describing enthusiasm for microfinance as a pernicious
byproduct of neo-liberalism).
199. NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: TURNING OPPRESSION
INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 187 (2009).
200. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (Everyman ed. 1910) (1776).
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support of Adam Smith’s generalization about what all people want by
revealing enthusiasm for microfinance as an engine of progress.  Charities
like Kiva, ACCION International, The Hunger Project (which sponsors an
African Woman Food Farmer Initiative), Opportunity International, Trickle
Up, and Women for Women International set out to channel donations
into microloan capital.201  These organizations pursue a famed tenet of
Maimonides, the Jewish medieval scholar, that charity reaches its greatest
height when it enables a recipient to become self-sufficient.202  Prosperous
but not conspicuously rich donors have found in microfinance their own
version of what has inspired charity from billionaires.
Charity is not the only way that foreign money could help underwrite
national microfinance-reparations programs.  For individuals who seek to
steer their funds in a direction that is both remunerative and socially pro-
gressive, the category of socially conscious investing finds a desirable mid-
point between self-enrichment and philanthropy that planners could
harness to strengthen the financing of their reparations programs.
Demand for this opportunity is strong in the United States. In 2008, a pop-
ular magazine noted that many Americans were “chasing returns in bare-
foot banking” and offered its readers pointers on how to combine the “the
do-good feel” with strong scores on “scale, efficiency, portfolio risk and
profitability.”203  The reparations proposal of this Article, which encour-
ages governments to work with existing microfinance institutions when
they can, fits well with this mixture of motives.  Our version of reparations
also seeks profit along with social progress.
Consistent with the design we propose, then, a nation announcing its
plan for reparations through microfinance might link its program to foreign
mutual funds that would buy shares of reparations-holding microfinance
institutions throughout the country.204  Wealthy foreigners have long had
access to private-placement funds that make equity investments in
microfinance institutions.205  The existence of these funds manifests a
market for microfinance investment vehicles that is likely to grow when
reparations planners link these vehicles to a quasi-charitable purpose.
Securitization of the institutions’ loans could invite smaller investors into
the reparations plan, broadening its base of support and interest to wel-
coming new stakeholders.
201. The website Brent’s Place, subtitled Information for a Better Life, has recom-
mended these organizations to donors. See BRENT’S PLACE, http://brentsplace.info/chari-
ties.shtml#microloans (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  The German nonprofit Welthunger
hilfe has a similar mission. See WELTHUNGERHILFE, http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/
about-us.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
202. See SUSAN R. JONES, LEGAL GUIDE TO MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 65– 66
(2004) (paraphrasing Maimonides).
203. Matthew Swibel, Microfinance Fever, FORBES, Jan. 7, 2008, at 50, 50– 52.
204. See generally Chen, supra note 92, at 793 (describing securitization as an instru-
ment for microcredit institutions “to further their human rights missions”).
205. See Swibel, supra note 203, at 757 (mentioning that Microplace.com, an eBay
initiative launched in October 2007, as an investment vehicle, offers shares “as little as
$100,” whereas larger entities like MicroVest, which raises money through private place-
ments, demands minimum investments of $100,000 or more).
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Conclusion
Self-help groups and indigenous informal savings and credit associa-
tions in many countries provide models for institutions that can administer
and distribute reparations payments.  These kinds of microfinance enti-
ties— which are frequently the only civil society institutions that survive
the breakdowns that a government might choose to address through repa-
rations— represent social capital for reconstruction.  Around the world,
poor women have participated actively in microfinance as a form of self-
help.  This participation has had mostly positive effects for them and the
societies in which they live.
In this Article, we have recommended that national governments look
to these existing institutions, along with more formal entities like credit
NGOs when they are available, to distribute the sums they appropriate for
post-crisis reparation.  The distribution that we recommend can both
establish a relatively safe place for savings and strengthen such places that
already exist.  It also assigns to recipients an equity stake in financial insti-
tutions that they can help govern to generate income.  Experience indicates
that a microfinance-based reparations scheme need not pursue a gender
agenda overtly to have feminist effects after implementation.  Establishing
or strengthening financial institutions that offer ownership, safe savings,
and communal participation through self-help necessarily makes poor
women better off, as long as female participants have a voice in the deci-
sions that the institutions make.206
We have focused on financial institutions that we characterize as semi-
formal and informal because such entities exist in almost every country,
making our plan universally feasible.  Some nations that install reparations
plans may lack institutions that can incorporate reparations payments and
need to build them from the ground.  This building can happen anywhere.
Just as every adult person holds some property,207 every nation-state has
some experience with ownership and amalgamation of capital that a repa-
rations scheme can leverage.
Our laying out a strategy for reparations has called for both a state-
ment of our starting points, so that implementing nations know where the
plan is coming from, and restraint in the formation of these premises, to
accommodate variation at the national and local level.  We have assumed
throughout that any reparations project undertaken by a national govern-
ment following a humanitarian crisis ought to advance social healing, eco-
nomic development, and the position of women, who in the aggregate are
unjustly disadvantaged.208  Because sociocultural contexts influence the
206. See LINDA MAYOUX & MARIA HARTL, INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., GENDER AND
RURAL MICROFINANCE: REACHING AND EMPOWERING WOMEN 57– 66 (2009), available at
http://www.ifad.org/gender/pub/gender_finance.pdf (offering checklists for a “gender
audit” to evaluate what a microfinance program does for women).
207. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 63, at 1 (noting the book title Portfolios of the Poor).
208. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS
(Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009) (arguing that the repair of human rights
violations following national conflict ought to be pursued as consistently with, not at
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ways in which a reparations program can advance these goals, however, we
have eschewed recommending any particular set of “best practices.”  We
have also made every effort to keep our predictions of gains conservative.
Experience has shown that networks of the institutions we describe
can be successfully built within two or three years.209  Stability in terms of
self-management, self-financing, and legal regularity not only for the
microfinance institutions but also for their network may take another three
to five years.  For reparations planners who seek sustainable impact,210
there is no alternative to institution-building and participation in owner-
ship, particularly by women.
the expense of, economic development).  On the subordination of women in the repara-
tions context, see Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations, supra note 6, at 39– 41 (summarizing R
data about economic disadvantage in the developing world); see also supra note 75 and R
accompanying text (noting four categories of impediments to women’s participation in
commercial markets); supra Part II.B (reviewing gender justice in international law).
Another pertinent data point about women’s economic disadvantage comes from the
United Nations 1995 estimate that the economic value of unpaid work performed each
year is $16 trillion dollars, with $11 trillion of that work, or more than two-thirds of it,
performed by women. See RAJ PATEL, THE VALUE OF NOTHING: HOW TO RESHAPE MARKET
SOCIETY AND REDEFINE DEMOCRACY 68 (2009).
209. For the generalizations in this paragraph about “experience,” we rely on Seibel’s
three-plus decades of familiarity with the development of microfinance institutions in
Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
210. Cf. supra Part II.A. (describing the danger of “cheap talk” in reparations).
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